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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to anaiyze NATO's third party roie in 
internationai confiict management in post Coid-War Europe which 
targets to suppiement the UN's regime in this regard. Firstiy, an 
internationai confiict and its management by third parties, 
particuiarly governmentai organizations, is examined within the 
framework of the UN Secretary Générai Ghali's theoreticai outiine 
cailed "An Agenda For Peace". This aims at ciarifying the concepts 
on which the anaiysis is built. Secondly, NATO's gradual 
adaptation to third party role in conflict management, from late 
1990 to June 1994, is sequentially presented together with its 
implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina to demonstrate that NATO 
has genuinely aspired to assume such a role in European conflicts. 
Thirdly, the possible third party roles that NATO could perform in 
the management of international conflicts are contemplated within 
the theoretical framework summarized in the first part. Finally, 
NATO's structural strengths and weaknesses are discussed to 
illustrate that NATO is still the unique regional organization which 
can assist the UN in managing international conflicts in Europe.
ÖZET
Bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaş sonrası Avrupa'da NATO'nun 
üçüncü taraf olarak, Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların 
yönetimine yönelik çabalarını tamamlayıcı nitelikteki rolü 
İncelenmektedir. öncelikle bu çalışmanın temel kavramlarını 
tanımlamak amacıyla, uluslararası anlaşmazlıklar ve bu 
anlaşmazlıkların üçüncü taraf olarak uluslararası kuruluşlarca yönetimi 
kavramları araştırılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, uluslarası anlaşmazlıkların 
yönetiminde NATO'nun üçüncü taraf rolü üstlenebilmek için nasıl bir 
değişim geçirdiği 1990 - 1994 dönemini kapsayacak biçimde
anlatılmakta ve bu çerçevede NATO'nun Bosna-Hersek sorununda 
üstlendiği görevler, sözkonusu teorik iddiaların bir uygulaması olarak 
ele alınmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, ilk bölümde ortaya konan teorik 
çerçevede, NATO'nun uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların yönetiminde 
üçüncü taraf olarak üstlenebileceği roller hakkında bir model 
çıkarılmaktadır. Son olarak da tüm yapısal zayıflıklarına rağmen 
NATO'nun Birleşmiş Milletlerin uluslararası anlaşmazlıkların 
yönetiminde etkili olabilecek yegane bölgesel örgüt olduğu sonucuna 
ulaşılmaktadır.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In course of the Cold War years NATO was a classical 
example of a defense alliance formed against a determined threat. 
As the security organization of the Western countries it was a 
principal party to the inter-bloc rivalry. However, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the consequent fall of the Eastern bloc has 
shattered the Cold War security balances in world politics. The 
direct military threat to the Allies' security has disappeared. Small 
scale conflicts, liberated from chains of the bloc politics, have re- 
emerged in Europe. NATO who strove to continue to preserve 
peace and stability in Europe has been compelled to adjust itself 
accordingly.
NATO's adjustment to new threats gave rise to two
fundamental changes in its self-perception as a defense alliance. 
First, since new threats would emerge as regional conflicts outside 
the Alliance territory, NATO could only involve in these conflicts as 
a third party. Second, in delineating the limits of its involvement, 
NATO should specify what kind of third party involvement it would 
conceive for itself. With the assets it possessed, the officia ls in 
Brussels decided that it could skillfully participate in the 
management of these conflicts.
With these in mind, this study attempts to analyze NATO's 
possible contribution to the international conflict management in 
Europe· as a third party. The first step is the elaboration of the
theoretical framework. Concepts such as international conflict, 
conflict management, conflict resolution, third party intervention 
and its dynamics are sought to be clarified through a survey of the 
literature. These concepts are, then, operationaily defined. Some 
graphs, charts and tables are introduced to make these 
abstractions easier to comprehend.
Following the presentation of the concepts, NATO's 
evolutionary move towards conflict management as a third party is 
dealt with through the review of major NATO documents issued 
from the end of the Cold War to June 1994. This is followed by the 
NATO decisions that enabled the implementation of these 
abstractions in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The texts of 
some of these documents and decisions, which seem signif icant for 
the scope of this study, are presented as appendices.
Finally, within the framework of the definitions made in the 
first part, possible third party roles that NATO could assume in 
international conflict management in Europe are illustrated. Tables 
are employed once more to more explicitly convey the meanings of 
these descriptions. Since no precedent of such a work existed on 
this subject by the time this study is done, the model in the final 
part is visualized by the writer.
The theoretical points raised in this study are displayed in 
the second and the fourth chapters. First, the meaning of 
international conflict is probed and why the term 'conflict' is 
preferred to 'crisis' is explained. A conflict is assessed in four 
phases as pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-war in order to readily 
display several forms of third party intervention for conflict
management. Furthermore, the difference between conflict 
resolution and conflict management is elucidated to avoid 
confusion. Second, the third party intervention for the 
management of an international conflict is handled. The conflict 
management and resolution regime of the United Nations (UN) is 
categorized as 'a third party intervention in international conflict by 
a governmental organization'. The theoretical revision of this 
management regime by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali in a study called "An Agenda For Peace" (1992), calling the 
regional security organizations to active participation, is regarded 
as the theoretical and legal guideline for NATO's contribution to 
the regime. Third, NATO's own management regime within the area 
sketched by the UN is postulated.
Reflections on this study's theoretical analysis constitute the 
third chapter and some parts of the fourth chapter. NATO's 
decisions towards adjustment to a new role in the management of 
international conflict as a third party, beginning from the 1990 
London Summit until the 1994 Brussels Summit, is covered in detail 
in the third chapter. The Alliance's intervention in the conflict in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is also reviewed in relation to the roles that 
NATO has played. The involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina is also 
treated as a case which shows the successes and failures of 
NATO's emerging conflict management regime as a third party. 
Accordingly, NATO's weaknesses and strong points as a credible 
third party are evaluated.
As a study done in the field of international relations, this 
work, firstly, aims at clarifying the conceptual confusion on the 
subject of third party intervention to international conflicts, 
observed particularly in the use of the terms crisis and conflict or 
peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. Secondly, it targets to 
combine the concept of third party intervention with NATO's new 
role in conflict management in Europe. Thirdly, it intends to draw 
a broad sketch for possible third party roles that NATO could 
assume in this regard. Finally, as regards the theoretical 
considerations it endeavors to present the academic literature on 
the third party intervention and practitioners' decisions for a better 
comprehension of the subject.
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT BY 
GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
AS THIRD PARTIES
CHAPTER ii
2.1 International Conflict and Its Management
Conflict can be defined as a "form of severely escalated natural 
competition between two or more parties about scarce resources, 
power and prestige" where "parties to a conflict believe they have 
incompatible goals and their aim is to neutralize, gain advantage 
over, injure or destroy one another"^ Yet, a definition of an 
international conflict requires some additional attributes. First, the 
participants should be international entities such as states or ethnic 
groups fighting for independence etc. Second, an international 
conflict should constitute a challenge to the existing international 
political system- regional or global. It "[should affect] power 
distribution, actors \ regimes, rules and alliance configuration" of a 
system.^
Regional conflicts, frequently seen in the emerging security 
environment in the post-Cold War era, are those posing a threat to 
regional systems. Hence, they are international conflicts, in effect. 
From a structural point of view any change in the system constitutes 
a challenge, as by definition an international system is composed of 
regional systems which are in interaction.
An international conflict is not a stagnant event. It evolves and 
passes through different phases. They are pre-crisis, crisis, war and 
post-war (see Figure 1). At the pre-crisis phase a conflict is latent. 
There is an unresolved problem at least from one party's point of view 
and it carries a potential to transcend into a crisis. Anything which 
seems to challenge the existing structure, or, any deliberate or 
unintentional act by either party may alter the prevailing situation in 
terms of the perceived interests of the protagonists. This can bring a 
conflict to the crisis phase.
A crisis usually covers a very limited time span in which the 
parties rapidly escalate their conflict. A fter reaching the climax, the 
conflict either de-escalates or moves further towards a war. Should 
conflict end with the efforts of at ieast one of the parties a new pre­
crisis phase arises. Due to the vitaiity of the decisions rendered 
during the crisis phase for the future of conflict, the decision- making 
procedures at this phase has always been the major focus of attention 
in the academic literature.
A war constitutes the third phase at which at least "one of the 
party's major objective has become harming the other[s]"^ through use 
of force. What differentiates a war from a crisis is the use of force. 
Consequently, halting of the use of force among the parties, that is 
securing a cease-fire, becomes the beginning of the post-war period.
The post-war phase of a conflict might be either a new pre-crisis 
period or a phase during which conflict resolution attempts are 
initiated for the removal of the real sources of a conflict through
degree of tension
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negotiations. If problem(s) causing a conflict are managed to be 
resolved, then a post-war phase might be labeled as a genuine peace. 
Otherwise, it becomes a new pre-crisis phase as the past experience 
of the principal parties would constitute a seed for a conflict which 
might break out at another time in another form.
The definition of a crisis is significant as in academic writings 
and sometimes in daily journals the term crisis refers to the conflict as 
a whole. This is actually a heritage of the Cold War y e a r s . S i n c e  the 
bipolar world system ended, the international conflicts are to be 
evaluated from a different perspective. The Cold War conflicts were 
usually in the form of proxy wars between the parties supported by 
either of the superpowers. They usually occurred and were contained 
in the Third World in order to eliminate the risk of a global nuclear 
war. Without following their natural pattern, these conflicts were 
stabilized at a point where they would not disturb the existing balance 
between the blocs. In sum from a superpower point of view they were 
contained at the crisis phase. This bipolarity mentality dominated 
academic and journalistic writings for over 50 years.
In the post-Cold War period, what is sometimes called as crises 
are the conflicts where parties defend their positions with all 
available instruments, with no superpower support. It is this 
difference between crisis definitions that led to confusion in 
terminology. 'Crisis' could be a proper term for describing the Cold 
War conflicts as they were managed at the crisis stage by the
superpowers, but in the post Cold-War period it connotes a phase of 
an international conflict (see Figure 1).
Similar to the use of the terms 'cris is ’ and 'conflict', the 
management attempts had also been viewed with the Cold-War 
mentality before 1990. Accordingly, the crisis management literature 
produced in the course of the Cold War period, concentrated on the 
decision making analysis, have handled the issue as "foreign policy 
crisis" of the superpowers .5
Actually in academic literature the attempts for managing or 
resolving international conflicts are categorized under two headings: 
Conflict resolution and conflict management (see Figure 2). Some 
international relations specialists assert that 'conflict management' is 
a proper term for describing a situation in which there exists an 
agreement among the persons with shared goals and values on 
making a choice among the alternative ways to reach shared goals or 
values . They claim that these are everyday experiences in the 
management of business and social life and so not appropriate for the 
terms dispute or conflict.®. They continue that conflict requires in- 
depth analysis of its sources and problem-solving in ways that do not 
compromise values and human needs.^ Therefore, to recognize 
initially the sources of conflict, and, to develop the ways to remove 
them are effective in resolving them.
Laue, following this line of thought maintains that people who 
use conflict management language "argue that they want to increase 
the abilities of parties to manage or self-regulate their conflicts
themselves because if conflicts escalate, external agents or agencies 
will step in and they try to bring the conflict within their own 
definitions of acceptable boundaries of social control."®
On the other hand, the scholars using the conflict management 
terminology claim that "managing a conflict involves making collective 
decisions, mounting field operations, exercising leadership, and 
building consensus"® among the disputants and it could be 
appropriate for all conflict analysis at any level.
The conflict management concept, here, will be treated as all 
sorts of efforts, initiated by either the parties to a conflict or third 
parties, aiming at ending the conflict at any phase without seeking to 
remove its real sources. Thus, a conflict resolution is taken as a 
broader area of operation embracing not only all the conflict 
management efforts but also the attempts to resolve problem(s) that 
initially led to the conflict (see Figure 2). Consequently, the 
underlying goal of conflict management efforts at all phases is rather 
to prevent escalation than to find a plausible solution to the core 
problems perceived. Therefore conflict management constitutes a 
large part of a conflict resolution process that lays the groundwork on 
which the real resolution efforts can be initiated.
With regard to the exclusive targets of conflict management at 
the different phases of a conflict it can be said that a pre-crisis period 
is the time span in which all efforts are devoted to prevent a potential 
crisis to transcend into an active one. These efforts, indeed, are 
complementary to the conflict resolution efforts if they are carried out
10
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with the concerns of removing the reasons of conflict perceived by the 
parties. A crisis is, then, managed through various initiatives short of 
war to return to the pre-crisis phase or to create a new one which is 
more convenient for resolution initiatives regardless of time pressure 
or war risks. In the course of a war, the endeavors are directed 
towards regulating and/or halting the use of force by either parties as 
soon as possible. The post-war management actions, on the other 
hand, are targeted to establish a regulatory mechanism, principles, 
and guidelines to arrange the post war relations among the 
protagonists on the particular issue area that yield to the war. It 
should be noted that all these efforts can be conducted by both 
principal and third parties.
2.2 International Conflict Management by Third Parties
A conflict has been defined as a kind of interaction between at 
least two parties who have incompatible interests on an issue. Once 
conflict manifests itself it might be managed through one or more of 
the following means: the use of force by the principal parties (both 
psychological and physical); various forms of direct or indirect 
negotiation; or the involvement of an external party in a binding or 
non binding fashion^®. Among these possible means of conflict 
management only the third party involvement in international conflicts 
will be briefly examined for the purpose of this study.
The term "third party" represents an intervention to a conflict 
situation by an exterior actor to the conflict. Rubin simply defines the
12
third party as an "individual [who] is in some way external to a dispute 
between two other parties, and who interposes (or is interposed ) 
between them [ d i s p u t a n t s ] , W h i c h e v e r  form third party intervention 
takes, the relationship between the principals and the third party has 
certain characteristics. First, "the role and involvement of the third 
party are ... typically peripheral to primary relationship..." and "the 
basis of the third party's involvement is necessarily different than that 
of the disputants." Young says that "third party intervention does 
not cover acts amounting to entry by a party into the crisis [conflict in 
general] as a participant on the same level as the original 
o p p o n e n t s . L a u e  adds that the third party is the one which is 
involved in a conflict by having "indirect stakes" (such as reputation or 
professionalism as intervention) unlike the first or the second parties 
who have direct stakes.
Second, if the third party becomes centrally involved in the 
relationship between the two principals, this would transform a "dyad" 
into a "triadic interaction".^® Incorporation of a third party in a 
conflict between the parties might lead to the formation of coalitions 
among the parties such as a coalition between the two principals to 
exclude the third party if they believe that the third party has a hidden 
agenda, or another one between one disputant and the third party if 
the third party favors one (or believed to favor). Even if the possible 
coalitions do not form, the possibility of their existence affects the 
perceptions of the principals and turns a bilateral relation into a
trilateral relationship. 16
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Third, the third party has in one way or another an aim to 
change, influence or reform the natural course of the events. 
Therefore, the term "intervention" is used for the involvement of a 
third party in a conflict. Laue defines the party intervention as 
follows:
"Conflict intervention occurs when an outside or semi­
outside party self-consciously enters into a conflict 
situation with the objective of influencing the conflict 
in a direction the intervenor defines as desirable. All 
intervention alters the power configuration among 
parties, thus all conflict intervention advocacy."’’ ®
That is why conflict management by third party intervention cannot be
described as 'neutral' as it often is. A third party may be impartial
(i.e. disinterested), but not neutral (i.e. having no effect on
outcome).
Rubin notes that even the mere presence of the third party 
alters the structure of a conflict and may have at least two effects on 
the natural course of the events. It may create a "pressure for 
movement from the stable stagnation of intractable conflict., or it may 
make it possible to disrupt this pattern of conflict intensification , by 
shifting the disputants' exclusive focus away from each other."
2.3 International Conflict Management by Governmental 
Organizations as Third Parties
There are only five groups of third parties, which might 
participate in an international conflict management: individuals - such 
as a special envoy of UN Secretary General or leader of trusted state.
14
states, non-governmental organizations - charity or religious 
organizations, international or regional governmental organizations, 
supra-national bodies such as European Union (EU) or Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS). Governmental organizations specifically 
can be categorized in two in terms of their contribution to conflict 
management: an international organization, the United Nations (UN) 
and regional organizations such as the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The developments in the post- 
Cold War era have shown that an effective third party intervention 
targeting to manage an international conflict requires to secure 
coordination and cooperation among both kinds of governmental 
organizations.
The necessity of coordination and complementary functioning of 
regional and international organizations is theoretically expressed in 
the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali's study called "An 
Agenda For Peace", written in 1992. The rising number of the 
international conflicts in world politics and the failure and inadequacy 
of both regional and international organizations in the management of 
these conflicts have demonstrated the necessity of arranging new 
conflict management mechanisms in which different organizations can 
take several roles in a coordinated and complementary fashion.
NATO, as a regional organization, has aspired to contribute to 
the management of the international conflicts in Europe as a third 
party. NATO adjusting to the international conflict management has
15
always stayed in the functioning area delineated by the UN Charter. 
This stemmed from the fact the basic failures of either organization 
might be overcome only through the complementary functioning of 
both in this regard. NATO's need for legitimacy for any kind of 
intervention can only be provided by the UN's consent. Whereas the 
UN, which proved to be inadequate in resolving and managing the 
rising number of the conflicts all around the world, should be 
supported by regional organizations such as NATO.
This urge for such a cooperation between the UN and regional
organizations is explicitly defined in Ghali's "An Agenda For Peace":
"The United Nations has recently encouraged a
rich variety of complementary e ffo rts ..... in this
new era of opportunity, regional arrangements or 
agencies can render great service if their 
activities are undertaken in a manner consistent 
with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter, 
and if their relationship with the United Nations, 
and particularly the Security Council, is 
governed by the Chapter VIII." 2"'
Ghali's statement reveals that the basic premise of the 
Alliance's involvement in international conflicts as a third party is 
derived from the UN Charter. Therefore, a general review of the 
international conflict regime delineated by the UN is considered a a 
necessity to properly assess NATO's role in this regard.
The UN acts as a third party in its conflict management regime 
because of the concept of collective security. As a supranational 
body the UN is considered impartial in conflict management or conflict 
resolution attempts as it is backed by the delegated consent of the 
sovereign states. Within this framework, the conflict management
16
regime which is embodied in the Charter envisages two broad 
approaches against violators of the principle of "refraining from the 
threat or use of force in any m a n n e r . T h e y  are peaceful settlement 
of disputes and collective measures for the prevention and removal of 
threats to the peace or acts of aggression.
The pacific settlement of disputes which is handled in Chapter 
VI of the Charter provides a logical progression of steps to be 
followed by states involved in disputes. It says if a dispute does 
arise, the parties should, before submission to a UN organ, "seek a 
solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, 
judicia l settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or 
other peaceful means of their own c h o i c e . H o w e v e r  the substitution 
of peaceful settlement for the reliance on force in resolving or 
managing conflicts had been disappointing in the UN record. Many 
conflicts are not submitted to the UN channels but handled through 
other means. This reluctance to use UN channels results as much 
from a desire by the parties to maintain their freedom of action as it 
does from a lack of confidence in UN processes.
The second way of managing international conflicts by the use 
of the UN is the collective measures of the Chapter VII of the Charter 
against the prevention and removal of threats to peace and acts of 
aggression. According to the collective security system drafted in 
Chapter VII, the Security Council is assigned the primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of peace. No automatic sanctions
17
are foreseen in the Charter but under Art. 25, UN members are legally 
obligated to accept and carry out all Security Council decisions.
If the Security Council finds a threat to peace or breach of the 
peace or act of aggression in a particular case, it invokes Art. 39. An 
explicit determination of this kind indicates that the issue is 
considered appropriate for measures under Chapter VII. It will decide 
on a course of action to maintain or restore peace. The measures are 
calling on the parties concerned to comply with " provisional peace", 
typically , a cease fire or withdrawal is a provisional measure (Art. 
40), resorting the non-forcible measures for applying economic, 
communicator, and diplomatic sanctions - such as economic embargo 
(Art. 41), or calling for military sanctions if the non- forcible measures 
outlined in Art. 41 would be inadequate.
In addition to these two broad approaches to conflict 
management. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes regional 
arrangements and agencies as appropriate means for maintaining 
peace and security, provided that these activities are consistent with 
the purpose and principles of the Charter. Indeed , Article 52 of the 
Charter requires states to make every effort to achieve peaceful 
settlement of "local disputes " through regional arrangements or 
agencies before referring such disputes to the UN Security Council. 
This proves that the Security Council had been initially intended to be 
the forum of last resort when states were unable to resolve conflicts 
between them through the peaceful means listed in Chapter VI or 
through regional instrumentalities.
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The Charter expressly directs the Security Council to utilize the 
regional arrangements or agencies covered by Chapter VIII for 
enforcement action v\/here appropriate, in Art. 53. The regional bodies 
are indirectly authorized to undertake enforcement action in as much 
as Art. 53 states that they may not do so without the authorization of 
the Security Council. Thus, in principle, the failure of the Council to 
grant permission for enforcement action would obstruct such action.
These clauses aim to equip the UN with necessary tools to 
manage international conflicts endangering international peace and 
security. The amalgam of its structural deficiencies and the bipolar 
nature of the international system hindered proper functioning of this 
management regime during the Cold War years. Accordingly, the 
necessity for an effective management regime led to a UN activity 
called as 'peacekeeping'.
The classic UN peacekeeping and the development of 
techniques to control violence through means other than enforcement 
or counter violence derives largely from the experience of UN 
operations during the Cold War. " Peacekeeping has traditionally been 
described as various forms of legitimized collective intervention by 
UN members aimed at avoiding the outbreak or resurgence of violent 
conflict between disputants. " Peacekeeping activities, though not 
included in the Charter, are the most significant and common form of 
a third party intervention to international conflicts.
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The 13 operations launched by the UN between 1948 and 1988 
produced a body of principles for peacekeeping operations. These 
principles are:
• exclusive authority of UN
• impartiality of the troops
• non-use of force or coercion except self defense
• consent of the parties involved in the conflict
• national character of the participating troops i.e. non-existence of 
a standby UN force.
Besides peacekeeping which has been added to the UN's 
conflict management due to the practical reasons the UN Secretary 
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali has theoretically revised it in 
accordance with the changing dynamics of the world politics. In the 
pamphlet entitled as "An Agenda for Peace" the general course for 
action in conflict management by the UN is categorized in four 
headings;
"Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes 
from arising between parties, to prevent existing 
disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the 
spread of the latter when they occur. Peace-making is 
action to bring hostile parties to agreement essentially 
through Such peaceful means as those foreseen in 
Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations 
presence in the field hitherto with the consent of all 
the parties concerned, normally incoming United 
Nations military and or place personnel and frequently 
civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of 
conflict and the making of peace. Peace-building 
action to identify and support structures which will tend
20
to strengthen and solid ify peace in order to avoid 
relapse into conflic t." 2®
Moreover, another category of action called peace-enforcem ent is 
also examined under the heading of peace-making. It is described as 
a mission to restore peace and maintain cease-fires through use of 
force. Actually, this intervention mechanism is d ifferent from the other 
forms of peace-making in that it envisages to secure a compliance to 
cease-fire among parties through enforcement. It entails the use of 
ground troops or air forces. Therefore, even if it u ltim ately serves to 
lay the necessary groundwork for the peace-making efforts, it is a 
d istinct category of action.(see Chart 1)
Peace enforcement also differs from peace-keeping. The 
defin ition of peace-enforcem ent contradicts with some of the basic 
principles of the UN in this regard. Peacekeeping troops are entitled 
to disengage the fighting parties. They have never been deployed 
with the aim of forcing parties to comply with any kind of action 
whether negotiated or not. Peace keepers never use force except in 
self-defense. However, a peace-enforcem ent action involves the use 
of force by a third party for the sake of halting aggression among 
warring p a r t i e s . T h e r e f o r e ,  peace-enforcement, here, is examined 
as d istinct category of third party intervention mechanism.
These categories are the general defin itions of the legitim ate 
patterns of third party intervention by international or regional 
governmental organizations. To complete the picture, now, the 
corresponding methods of conflict management will be incorporated
21
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with the conflict analysis derived in the firs t part of these general 
guidelines.
Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence 
breaks out. Hence, it basically refers to the attempts initiated in the 
pre-crisis period of a conflict. Peacemaking efforts are various kinds 
of third party activities to reach temporary peace that protagonists 
could negotiate. In other words, they are the in itiatives taken to reach 
a real peace through negotiation. Peace building follows peacemaking 
efforts in order to consolidate the peace or the post war status quo 
achieved at the end of a war. All efforts in this phase are devoted to 
the removal of the real sources of conflict. Hence, peace building 
actions are theoretically analyzed as conflict resolution attempts. It is 
actually the peace-building efforts which exp lic itly delineate the 
concept of conflict resolution from 'the concept of conflict 
management'.
The most delicate defin ition, in this context, is of peace-keeping 
activ ities. They can be required fo r the firs t three phases of conflict 
each serving the aim of preparing a conducive ground for a resolution. 
At the pre-crisis phase the preventive deployment, that is the physical 
separation of the potentia lly hostile parties through the UN 
peacekeeping forces, targets to prevent the escalation of a conflict. In 
a crisis or a war period peacekeeping aims at halting violence and the 
preservation of peace, once it is attained in order that peace-building 
measures could be initiated to avoid the recurrence of violence (see 
Chart 2) In sum the UN, which is based on the concept of
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collective security, has a complete theoretical picture of the resolution 
and the management of international conflicts. In response to the 
rising demand in UN’s con flic t management actions since the end of 
the Cold War, the UN Secretary General Ghali has revised this regime 
and increased third party intervention mechanisms by the 
governmental organizations. Ghali's contribution is s ign ificant in the 
sense that besides giving the defin itions for several third party 
interventions, he calls the regional organizations to actively 
participate in these actions in a complementary manner.
This situation has concurred with NATO's aspirations to adopt 
such a third party role in international conflicts in Europe. This 
elaboration of the UN management system has provided the 
necessary legal framework for NATO. NATO has, consequently, 
altered its fo rty-five  years old defense alliance identity and added a 
new dimension which is presented as a regional security organization 
which seeks to contribute international conflic t management in 
Europe, as a third party in supplementing UN's role in this regard. In 
the next chapter NATO's adaptation to this new identity is elaborated.
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CHAPTER III
NATO'S ADJUSTMENT TO THE ROLE OF
THIRD PARTY IN INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT
3.1 NATO's Third Party Role in In ternational C onflic t  
M anagem ent in Europe
Following the end of Cold War the North A tlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) which was orig inally a defense alliance has been 
gradually transformed into a regional security organization. Its basic 
orientation has accordingly shifted to conflic t management. This 
transform ation, under the pressing urges of the changing nature of 
threats perceived by the A lliance, has taken place in a laggard 
manner. The demise of the single threat against the security of the 
A llies has yielded to a deliberate in itia tive w ithin the organization to 
develop theoretical and practical tools for an effective conflic t 
management in Europe.
As a defense organization NATO managed to prevent an intra 
alliance conflict, with some exceptions such as Cyprus, along with 
averting any outside aggression against its members fo r 40 years. In 
the post-Cold W ar era NATO needs to be responsive to possible
conflicts among non-members to preserve peace and stab ility in 
Europe for the common benefit of all members.'' This entails the 
necessity of carrying out operations outside the alliance territory, 
thus, intervening in conflicts as a third party whose interest lies at the 
preservation of peace and stab ility in the region.
A careful review of the evolution of NATO since its inception 
shows that it has always been in a mood of change in response to the 
developments in international arena. In the course of Cold W ar years, 
these changes were directed by the events on the East-West
agenda, respectively championed by the two superpowers. The 
A lliance was faced only with the Soviet threat and its ability to attack 
an ally. The changes in the nature of this threat were directed by 
e ither technological developments in conventional and the nuclear 
weapon production or the Soviet expansionist maneuvers. NATO 
strategies were contingent upon the Soviet capability to in flic t damaae 
upon the alliance countries and a possible expansionist assault. 
Accordinolv it was easier for NATO strateoists to formulate defense 
plans fo r the A llies.The sudden fa ll of the Soviet Union, also leading 
to the dismemberment of Eastern bloc, however, altered the nature of 
threat in two radical ways. First, the threats to stab ility and peace in 
the A lliance area have become m ultid irectional: nobodv would easily 
predict from where threats might emerge. Second, threats were no 
longer solelv m ilitary in nature. Economic, social, environmental
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challenges inflam ing ethnic tensions within states, and nationalist 
aspirations made contingency planning a tougher work to handle for 
NATO strategists.
This situation urged a fundamental change in the strategy of the 
alliance which, otherwise, would be charged with being obsolescent 
w ithin the newly emerging international security structure. Some 
circles started to joke about NATO saying that the acronym NATO 
stood for "No A lternative To Obsolescent".2 Thus a series of 
transform ation attempts commenced within the A lliance immediately 
after the traces of a radical change in world politics had surfaced.
Under the guidance of these changing dynamics of the 
international security system, NATO has altered its priorities on the 
basis of the principles of its founding W ashington Treaty (1949) and 
the UN Charter. Indeed, NATO has always been a prolongation of the 
UN security regime as summarized in the firs t chapter. The 
W ashington Treaty setting up a defense alliance was concluded in 
reference to A rticle 51 of the UN Charter which acknowledges 
individual or collective self defense as nations' inherent right in case 
of an aggression.
During Cold War years NATO has always tended to operate 
w ithin the legal framework of the UN Charter. This tendency continued 
under the recent drives of change that led NATO to adjust itse lf to a 
new role in international conflic t management. NATO's new role as
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third party is envisaged in functioning area framed by Chapter VIII of 
the UN Charter which authorizes the regional security organizations in 
this regard. NATO's intervention to conflicts takes place in reference 
to the Art. 52 and Art. 53 of the UN Charter that entitle regional 
security organizations to manage conflicts through either peaceful 
means or through various enforcement mechanisms including the use 
of force conditional upon a request by the UN Security Council.
Internally, NATO's adjustment to conflic t management in Europe 
has occurred in a two-track fashion. With a politica l approach NATO 
has planned to prevent possible conflicts with and among the former 
adversaries through integrating them into the alliance security system. 
Through a m ilitary approach it has targeted to manage international 
conflicts ranging from civil wars to ethnic conflicts by means of 
m ilitary assets.
The form er conflict management method used by NATO which 
might be called prevention by integration targets to contain possible 
hostilities among the newly independent states and NATO countries 
through integrating them in some kind of a cooperation structure 
which would enable NATO countries to control these conflicts. It has 
been manifested with the newly established security forums like North 
A tlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) (1991) and the Partnership for 
Peace (P for P) (1994) scheme. The A llies themselves are the 
members of these forums, they attempt to prevent conflicts through
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such cooperation forums at which conflicts can be managed or 
resolved.
On the other hand NATO has also launched to re-structure its 
m ilitary assets in order that it could more effective ly intervene in the 
conflicts endangering peace and stab ility in the region. The reduction 
in nuclear and conventional weapons, the shrinkage in number of 
troops through various international arms reduction treaties, and the 
designs towards the formation of new forces called Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF, 1994), fo r more rapid and flexib le  intervention, 
are the efforts which ultim ately serve this end.
International political transform ation attempts w ithin NATO 
in itia lly  started to be chartered at the London Summit, of the NATO 
heads of the state and government, July 7-8 1990. 16 leaders
declared that the security of every state is inseparably linked to the 
security of its neighbors. The alliance consequently became an 
institu tion in which 16 participating states not only continued to 
provide fo r the ir common defense but also to build new relationships 
with all the nations of Europe including former adversaries. At this 
summit the NATO leaders also declared their intention to enhance the 
politica l component of the A lliance .3 The Summit was the beginning 
of NATO's gradual adaptation to its conflict management role in 
Europe. Surrounded by the rapidly evolving European geopolitical
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landscape, it prepared the Alliance for a cooperation with the Warsaw 
Pact nations.
The turning point in the Alliance history as regards conflict 
management took place in Rome in December 1991. The meeting of 
state and government heads of 16 NATO members changed the 
strategy of the Alliance and issued 'A New Strategic Concept'. Unlike 
the previous strategies which were designed for a possible 
confrontation with the Soviet Union in Europe, the new strategy is a 
general guideline for NATO as to how it would adapt itse lf to the role 
of con flic t management. This document which outlines NATO's future 
po litica l and military approaches towards conflic t management in 
Europe is analyzed in detail below to demonstrate the theoretical 
preparation of NATO.
This document expressively states that NATO's perception of 
threat has changed. The Allies enunciate that "the risks to Allied 
security .... are multi-faceted in nature and m ultid irectional which 
makes them hard to predict and assess" and add that these risks 
might emerge from "the serious economic, social and political 
d ifficu lties  including ethnic rivalries and territoria l disputes which can 
be faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe". These 
risks are expected to either directly threaten the A llies or to come 
forth as conflicts which are "inim ical to European stab ility  and even to 
armed conflicts which could involve outside powers or spill over into
31
NATO countries, having direct e ffect on the security of alliance". 
Therefore NATO should be ready to respond to such risks whichever 
form they might take for the security of the A llies (See Appendix ill 
paragraph #10).
The New Strategic Concept also defines the essential purpose 
of the alliance as follows:
"The means by which the A lliance pursues its security 
policy to preserve the peace will continue to include 
the maintenance of m ilitary capability suffic ient to 
prevent war and to provide for effective defense; and 
overall capability to manage successfully crises 
affecting the security of its members and the pursuit of 
political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations 
and the active search fo r a cooperative approach to 
European security including in the field of arms control 
and disarmament.'"^
Even if the defense purpose of the alliance is preserved, NATO’s
fundamental objective is, now, described as the "successful
management of the crises" affecting the security of its members.
This sh ift in the alliance priorities is unveiled when the
fundamental task is outlined. W hile "deterrence and defense against
any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member
state" is enumerated as the third, achieving the essential purpose of;
"[providing] one of the indispensable foundations for a 
stable security environment in Europe, based on the 
growth of democratic institu tions and commitment to 
the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no 
country would be able to intim idate or coerce any 
European nation or to impose hegemony through the 
threat or use of force"
is given the top priority. (See Appendix III, paragraph # 21)
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The m ilitary approach to conflic t management is explicitly 
displayed in the force posture. The missions of the Alliance m ilitary 
forces are enumerated as guaranteeing the security and territoria l 
integrity of member states and responding to "diverse and m ulti­
directional risks A lliance forces have in performing different functions 
in peace, crisis and war" (See Appendix III paragraph # 41).
The Allies signal that they might undertake several functions in 
such periods through the d iffe ren tia tion  of the missions of the m ilitary 
forces in the course of peace, crisis and war. In peace "the role of 
A llied m ilitary forces is to guard against risks to the security of 
A lliance members". In time of crises "which might lead to a m ilitary 
threat to the security of A lliance members the A lliance's m ilitary 
forces can complement and re inforce political actions within a broad 
approach to security and thereby contribute to the management of 
such crises and the ir peaceful resolution." War referred as a general 
war in Europe is regarded as "highly unlikely [but] it cannot fina lly  be 
ruled out". Hence, the "appropriate mix of [A lliance's m ilitary] forces" 
and capabilities "which have as the ir mission to protect peace, have to 
provide the essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum 
level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and should aggression 
occur, to restore peace". (See Appendix III paragraphs 42,43,44)
NATO's new force posture is designed in response to the 
changing nature of the threats. The effective response to international
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conflicts in Europe necessitates an alliance which will be able to 
flexib ly respond to a wide spectrum of contingencies. They, thus, 
properly contribute to crisis management, peacekeeping and war 
prevention while maintaining the means to defend the security and 
territo ria l integrity of member states.^
A smaller, more flexib le , and mobile new force posture is 
foreseen. The new forces can generally be maintained at lower states 
of readiness focusing on the protection of peace and the management 
of conflicts. They include a greater role for m ultinational formations.® 
Indeed all categories of the main defense posture are structured 
to respond to the required con flic t management function effectively. 
Three types of essential forces are designed for an effective 
function ing of the conflict management: the main defense forces, the 
reaction forces and the augmentation forces. Even the defense forces 
are designed in a form that could effective ly be used for the conflict 
management. These forces w ill also be m ultinational in nature.
In addition to the m ilitary approach, the successful management 
of conflicts threatening stab ility  in Europe was then intended to be 
handled intensely through the prevention by integration scheme. This 
tendency caused a s ign ificant in itia tive toward the conflict 
management in Europe via setting up security forums between NATO 
and the former Warsaw Pact countries . This special security 
arrangement, which is called the North A tlantic Cooperation Council
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(NACC)is formed as "a forum for dialogue and consultation on political 
and security related issues and for partnership in practical 
cooperation activities, in areas of NATO competence" in 19917 
Formerly an expression of the prevention by integration policy NACC 
was intended to contribute "as the primary consultative body between 
NATO and liaison states on security .... issues and [subsidiary] body 
in controlling crises in Europe" as then the US Secretary of State 
Baker stated in 1992.® However, NATO countries tend to view this 
forum basically as a consultation mechanism while the liaison partners 
have been stressing the cooperative dimension. NATO countries 
acted as a unified body as opposed to the new partners on various 
in itia tives for common security cooperation schemes which put them 
into the position of a principal party.^
As regards the changes brought by the New Strategic Concept 
the term inology used in the document is worth being stressed. The 
role that NATO attempted to assume in the European security system 
is termed as a conflict management in this study due to the reasons 
referred in the second chapter. However NATO documents or the 
writings in the international press described it as crisis management 
or peacekeeping. In fact in several paragraphs of the New Strategic 
Concept the terms of con flic t and crisis are used interchangeably 
while in some others they are differentia ted in line with the analysis of 
this paper. For instance in paragraph 10 of the New Strategic
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Concept the term 'crises' is d ifferentia ted from 'armed conflicts ' which 
are, here, termed as war . In some paragraphs such as #14, 20, 30, 
32, 38 (see Appendix ill) the term 'crisis ' is used vaguely. In some 
other paragraphs such as #33, 43 (see Appendix III.) "resolution of 
crisis [instead of conflict] at an early stage" is mentioned whereas the 
term crisis management is stated in the follow ing sentences of the 
same paragraph.
As the missions of the alliance m ilitary forces are outlined in the 
New Strategic Concept (see Appendix III, paragrah # 41-47), it is 
stated that the forces would be used in peace, in crises affecting the 
security of the Alliance, and in wars in which NATO is involved. This 
exp lic itly  demonstrates what is meant by 'war'. War would be an 
armed conflic t where NATO is a principal party. That's why the term 
"crisis" seemed to be used to d iffe ren tia te  the conflicts which requires 
an effective management as a third party. In conclusion the term 
crisis is employed to refer to the d iffe ren t phases of a conflict that 
affect the security of the A lliance. In consequence, the New Strategic 
Concept, though displaying the Cold War mentality, and contributing 
to the term inology confusion, actually foresees a complete course for 
action for the management of con flic t at all phases.
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3.2 A C hronolog ica l Analysis of NATO's Third Party  
invo lvem ent in in ternational C onflic t Managem ent
The historic decisions taken at London (1990) and Rome (1991) 
Summits are succeeded by two other bold decisions by NATO. One 
was taken at the M inisterial meeting of the North A tlantic Council 
(NAC) in Oslo in June 1992. NATO Foreign Ministers announced their 
readiness "to support , on a case by case basis in accordance with 
the ir own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsib ility 
of Organization fo r Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This 
includes making available A lliance resources, expertise and 
coordination capabilities for peacekeeping o p e r a t i o n s " . T h u s ,  
NATO committed itse lf to support international peacekeeping by 
offering to make its capabilities and assets available 'on a case-by- 
case basis' at the specific request of the OSCE. It was a carefully 
worded statement of political intent , taking account of m isgivings 
about any expansion of NATO's role beyond the collective defense 
commitment enshrined in the W ashington Treaty. Against the 
background of this in itia l decision , NATO military authorities began to 
examine the resources and m odalities of the A lliance for support for 
the international con flic t management.
In itia lly  this took the form of generic planning under the 
auspices of the Supreme A llied Commander Europe (SACEUR) aimed 
at developing a doctrinal basis for a mixture of missions ranging from
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humanitarian re lie f and low-intensity conflict to war. The original 
intention was to produce a catalogue of NATO 'assets and 
capabilities' and to develop a low -level doctrine for operations with 
which NATO was highly unfamiliar.
Political authorities w ithin NATO soon after Oslo Decision 
became occupied with the continuing conflict in the Balkans. They 
recognized that NATO could not optim ize its new role of supporting 
crisis management and peacekeeping if it placed itse lf exclusively 
under the OSCE umbrella. The fa ilure of the OSCE Secretariat in 
Prague, let alone its C onflict Prevention Center, to coordinate actions 
with NATO and provide guidelines for planning over Yugoslavia, led to 
search for more effective mechanism for the management of this 
conflict. Thus in December 1992, the North A tlantic Council also 
committed itse lf to supporting operations under the authority of the 
UN Security Council.'’ ''
Following this December 1992 statement which put NATO 
assets in support of peacekeeping operations under the authority of 
the UN Security Council, NATO Foreign Ministers reviewed 
peacekeeping and sanction enforcement measures already being 
ind ividually undertaken by NATO countries and as Alliance to support 
the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions relating to 
the conflic t in the form er Yugoslavia. This indicated that the Alliance 
was ready to respond positively to further in itia tives that the UN
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Secretary General might take in seeking Alliance assistance in this 
fieldJ2
Naturally, this decision had implications for NATO defense 
planning. The Defense Ministers of NATO countries participating in 
the Defense Planning Committee meeting in December 1992 reiterated 
an Alliance commitment to peacekeeping. In a permanent session, 
specific measures in such areas as command and control, log istic 
support , infrastructure, and tra ining and exercises which would 
enhance NATO's peacekeeping capabilities were outlined and decided 
to be refined through NATO's force planning process. It was agreed 
that support for the UN and the OSCE peacekeeping should be 
included among the missions of NATO forces and headquarters.
The NACC, which was in itia lly  set up for political purposes, took 
a decision which had m ilitary implications. Foreign Ministers of 
partic ipating countries to NACC agreed to share experience and 
expertise in peacekeeping and related matters with one another and 
with other OSCE states. They also expressed the ir determ ination to 
contribute to OSCE goals in prevention and management of conflicts 
and settling disputes peacefully as well as their readiness to support 
and contribute on a case by case basis to peacekeeping operations 
under the UN authority or OSCE responsibility.
NACC members also decided to form an "Ad Hoc Group on 
Cooperation in Peacekeeping". This group prepared a report, in
39
Athens, in June 1993, aiming to develop a common understanding on 
third party intervention to the conflict management in the area 
covered by NACC countries. These decisions aimed at combining the 
prevention by integration approach with the m ilitary approach and 
build an active conflict management system for NATO. The report 
produced by Ad Hoc Group is s ign ificant in terms of summarizing the 
conceptual and practical guidelines for the conflict management as a 
third party.
In describing the conceptual connotations of the peacekeeping 
activity the report used five categories of action which would be 
employed at d ifferent phases of a conflict. They are conflic t 
prevention, peacemaking , peacekeeping , peace enforcement, and 
peace-building as was the case in the UN Secretary General Ghali's 
'An Agenda for Peace'. They include a whole range activities from fact 
finding missions to using m ilitary means.
This document is remarkable in the sense that it specifies 
NATO's vague interpretation of crisis management in New Strategic 
Concept . It proves that o ffic ia l rhetoric as "participation to the 
peacekeeping activities under the OSCE or UN mandate" indeed 
refers to a wide spectrum conflic t management activ ities by the third 
parties ranging from preventive deployment to the use of m ilitary 
means.
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The conceptual approaches outlined by the Ad Hoc group have 
additionally two notable aspects from NATO's third party intervention 
view. First, the Group has taken the UN Charter Chapter VI and 
Chapter VII as the main operation area and used the UN Secretary 
General Boutros Ghali's 'An Agenda on Peace' defin itions as the basis 
of the conceptual understanding of the NACC's management regime 
proving NATO's commitment to the UN principles. Second, these 
defin itions display what NATO mean by peacekeeping operation under 
UN or OSCE mandate. Thus they constitute the principal guide to 
NATO's future operations in con flic t management as third party.
These series of decisions toward setting up a conflict 
management regime, in general, were continued with another summit 
meeting of the state or government heads of the 16 nations in 
Brussels on January 10-11 1994. At this summit, NATO countries 
maintained the ir two track approach to conflict management. As an 
extension of the prevention by integration approach the 16 nations 
offered to the NACC members, which were not satisfied with the 
NACC cooperation scheme, as well as to other European states a new 
strategic cooperation channel called "Partnership fo r Peace" (P fo r P). 
This proposal was actually a kind of compromise between the former 
Warsaw Pact countries specifica lly Visegrad Countries, Poland , 
Czech and Slovak Republics, and Hungary which were seeking full 
membership and the Russian Federation which stated that it would
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perceive such an expansion of Alliance as a threat to itself. 
Through this cooperation mechanism, all e lig ib le states would form 
closer political and m ilitary relations with NATO at a level determined 
by the ir own will. The Partners for Peace might actively participate in 
both the North A tlantic Council (NAC) meetings at the political level 
and be active on the m ilitary side of the Alliance through permanent 
liaison officers in NATO Headquarters and a separate Partnership 
Coordination Cell at Mons (Belgium) under the authority of the NAC.
'Partners' would be able to participate in m ilitary planning and 
common maneuvers if they desire."'® Then, NATO Secretary General 
Manfred W orner in describing the Partnership for Peace mechanism 
stressed the m ilitary aspect of the cooperation and noted that:
"Partner states would work towards the development 
of cooperative m ilitary relations with NATO, for the 
•purpose of jo in t planning, training and exercises in 
*· to strengthen the ir ab ility  to undertake missions 
in til·^ i" nf peacekeeping and humanitarian 
operations.""'^
The Partnership for Peace in itia tive iic '  ‘«ecome very popular 
and 23 Eastern European and former Soviet Republics signed it. 
This compromise even attracted the Russian Federation and it 
declared its intention to join. However Russia claimed that it could not 
participate on equal terms with the others. Russia's integration into 
the conflic t management system of NATO actually has a great 
importance since in the absence of Russia, having extra territoria l 
interests in all the former Soviet Republics and Eastern and Central
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European States, NATO's political approach to conflict management 
would be insuffic ient.
The military dimension of the management regime was decided 
to be reinforced at the Brussels Summit through the formation of the 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This is the establishm ent of 
multinational task forces of NATO and non-NATO troops that would 
conduct jo in t m ilitary exercises and be ready to move quickly in 
conflict management. These forces involve troops from diffe ren t 
branches of the armed services and from different countries - six 
West European NATO members along with Poland and Hungary. The 
operative principle of CJTF will be "separable but not separate" 
forces. According to this program some NATO countries might not 
take part in specific task force action , even if the North A tlantic 
Council (NAC) would have to approve such an action.
The formation of the Combined Joint Task Forces has indeed 
three conseque;,ces in terms cf NATO's conflict management role as 
third party. First, it is a genuine e ffo rt towards the act nplishment of 
conflic t management as the m ilitary restructuring is the primary 
condition fo r the effective conflic t management regime. Second, this 
approach is the combination of political and m ilitary approaches which 
enhances NATO’s ability to respond to the conflicts in the region. It is 
a political attempt because the CJTF would be composed of the troops 
from the signatories of the Partnership for Peace if they desire, which
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make them an integral part of this m ilitary arrangement. Third, the 
separable but not separate characteristic of the CJTF signifies the 
importance of the internal dynamics of change in the organization's 
transform ation to the conflict management system. This is designed 
to solve the problem of burden sharing and aimed at satisfying a 
desire of France and other European nations to establish a more 
independent defense identity. Hence, European nations w ithout the 
US would be able to take part in the international conflicts 
endangering the regional stability on their own.
.Under these monitoring operations NATO forces have reported 
the has, thus, adjusted itse lf to the role of conflict management in 
Europe. The prevention by integration scheme continues in political 
platforms, whereas NATO’s m ilitary involvement in the conflict 
management as a third party is tested on the ground, in the conflic t in 
form er Yugoslavia. The A lliance's active involvement to a conflic t as 
third party started with the implementation of UN resolutions for the 
con flic t in the form er Yugoslavia, rather than OSCE's. In July 1992, 
one month after the Oslo Meeting, NATO put its assets in service of 
the implementation of the UN resolutions. This was five months earlier 
than the December 1992 decision of the NAC to support peacekeeping 
operations under UN authority. This practice elucidates the fu tility  of 
the concept such as OSCE peacekeeping which reveals nothing but 
the discrepancy between its means and mandate.
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NATO's contribution to conflict management in former 
Yugoslavia have taken place in four basic forms: monitoring,
enforcement, ground operations and contingency planning. 
Monitoring operations began with NATO ships belonging to the 
A lliance's Standing Mediterranean Naval Force in the Adriatic in 
support of the UN economic embargo against Serbia and Montenegro 
and the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former 
Yugoslavia according to Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757. 
From October 1992, this operation coordinated with a parallel 
monitoring operation under the auspices of he Western European 
Union, has been supported by NATO airborne early-warning a ircraft 
(AWACS) and maritime patrol a ircraft monitoring the UN mandated 
NATO fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Under these monitoring operations NATO forces have reported 
the possible violations on a daily basis to the Headquarters of the 
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Zagreb, which were 
passed to UN Headquarters in New York as the basis for bi-weekly 
reports to the UN Security Council. These monitoring activities 
undertaken by NATO are peacekeeping operations launched in the 
war phase of the conflict.
Enforcement operations in support of UN sanctions, involve the 
fu lfillm en t of peace-enforcement which differs from other third party 
intervention mechanisms in that it involves the use of force. Such
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operations of NATO naval forces in the Adriatic, began in November 
1992 as an extension of naval monitoring operations of July 1992. 
They were conducted in cooperation with the Albanian authorities in 
order to prevent the circumvention of UN embargoes through the use 
of Albanian territoria l waters.
On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 
816 authorizing enforcement of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and requested the assistance of regional organizations 
such as NATO to help UNPROFOR to implement the tasks of the no­
fly-zone and the protection of safe areas under the provisions of 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. UN Resolution 816 extended the ban 
to cover flights by all fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the 
airspace of Bosnia and Herzegovina except those authorized by 
UNPROFOR. In the event of further violations, it authorized member 
states to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with the 
ban. An enforcement operation involving fighters and reconnaissance 
aircrafts from various Alliance nations and NATO airborne early- 
warning aircraft flying mainly from air bases in northern Italy and from 
an a ircra ft carrier in the Adriatic, began in early April 1993.
As far as ground operations are concerned the A llies have 
undertaken peacekeeping operations NATO expressed its w illingness 
to support actions undertaken under UN responsib ility to ensure the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia-Herzegovina, including
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personnel or other resource contributions such as transportation, 
communications and logistics. In addition , NATO declared its 
readiness to support the UN to monitor heavy weapons in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina and offered to the UN and OSCE to provide contingency 
planning fo r these tasks.
On July 22 1993, NATO stated that it was ready to o ffer 
"protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the 
performance of its overall mandate, if it is requested." The North 
A tlantic Council re iterated this commitment at a special meeting on 2 
August 1993. On 9 August 1993 NAC clarified that air strikes 
foreseen by the Council decision of August 2 were lim ited to the 
support of humanitarian relief, and it must not be interpreted as a 
decision for m ilitary intervention.
At the declaration fo llow ing the North A tlan tic  Council held in 
Brussels on 10-11 January 1994, the heads of state and government 
reaffirm ed the ir readiness under the authority of the United Nations 
Security Council and in accordance with the A lliance decisions of 2 
and 9 August 1993 , to carry out air strikes in order to prevent the 
strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened areas 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina.''^ Any decision to launch such air strikes 
would require the approval of the North A tlantic Council and then the 
UN Security Council.
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The no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina was violated by 
warplanes which attacked a Muslim controlled ammunition factory in 
Central Bosnia and two US F-16 fighters brought down four Bosnian- 
Serbs' light attack bombers on 28 February 1994. It was the firs t time 
the no-fly-zone was violated by warplanes. The overwhelming majority 
of the vio lations that NATO detected were occasional helicopter 
fligh ts by the various sides.2°
Between February and May 1994 NATO actively continued 
peace enforcement actions in the former Yugoslavia. Following a 
mortar attack into a crowded market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, 
which caused 61 killings and 200 woundings, NATO issued a 
ultimatum on 9 February 1994 tha t it would order air strikes against 
Bosnian Serbs' artillery or heavy weapons involved in the siege of 
Sarajevo unless they were withdrawn or placed under UN control in 10 
days.2·' Bosnian Serbs complied with the NATO ultimatum to pull 
back the ir heavy guns and NATO did not launch air strikes against the 
Serb forces around the Sarajevo.
In the beginning of April 1994, upon a request by the UN 
Secretary General to authorize air strikes in defense of UN "safe 
areas" in Bosnia- Sarajevo, Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Tuzia, Zepa 
according to UN Resolution 824, the North A tlantic Council (NAC) 
issued another ultimatum, on April 22 1994, warning that it would 
launch air strikes against heavy weapons and other military targets
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within 20 km of the besieged eastern Bosnian city of Gorazde unless 
Bosnian Serbs immediately stopped the ir attacks against this city. 
This was the active implementation of peace enforcement through the 
threat of use of force. Bosnian Serbs retreated in compliance with 
NATO's ultimatum. Upon the request by UN Secretary General Boutros 
Boutros Ghali on 18 April 1994, The Allies also issued ultimatums on 
23-24 April 1994 analogous to the ones fo r Gorazde which put in 
e ffect four other "safe areas" (Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzia and Zepa) 
under NATO protection in expectation of providing successful third 
party protection in these areas in a sim ilar way.
Finally, NATO Military Authorities has been carrying out 
contingency planning for a range of options to support UN activities 
re lating to the conflict in form er Yugoslavia in parallel with the 
developments taking place. The contingency plans fo r the 
enforcem ent of a no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina; the 
establishm ent of re lie f zones and safe havens for civilians in Bosnia; 
and ways to prevent the spread of the conflic t to Kosovo and the 
form er Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, are prepared under the 
authority of the NATO, and passed to the UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request to access in December 1992.22
Additionally, early contingency planning with respect to the 
A lliance 's role in support of UN in itiatives to restore peace in former 
Yugoslavia was also undertaken by NATO m ilitary authorities. Since
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March 1993 they have also been planning for contingency options for 
possible im plementation of a UN peace plan fo r Bosnia- Herzegovina, 
which might be signed by all parties to the con flic t.2^ These
constitute NATO's contribution to peace-making during a war.
In brie f NATO's adjustment to international con flic t management 
in Europe which started in London (1990) found its full theoretical 
expression in the "New Strategic Concept" in 1991. The progress 
towards the im plementation of this in itia tive was launched in 1992 in 
support of the UN peacekeeping activities in the conflic t in form er 
Yugoslavia. This rough commitment for international conflict 
management is theore tica lly refined in the NACC's Ad Hoc 
Committee's document dated June 1993 which has demonstrated that 
NATO fu lly  advocated the UN defin itions of third party intervention in 
international conflic ts. The conflic t in Bosnia-Herzegovina has also 
provided NATO with a case by which it could test the lim its of its 
capabilities in this regard. From a theoretical perspective this 
involvem ent has two additional points of s ign ificance which is handled 
in the next chapter. First, it assisted observers to speculate on 
possib ilities for NATO's third party roles that it could take in the 
management of in ternational conflicts. Second, it has shown that 
NATO should secure a better coordination mechanism with the UN 
upon whose consent it is contingent for intervention.
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CHAPTER IV
AN ANALYSIS OF NATO’S THIRD PARTY ROLE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
4.1 A Model for NATO's Possible Third Party Roles In International 
Conflict Management
NATO’s intervention in international conflicts in Europe as a 
third party is designed to be complementary to the UN's. This stems 
from two reasons: First, the capacity of UN is inadequate to manage 
all conflic ts which occur simultaneously in several regions of the 
world. Therefore regional security organizations should assist the UN 
in its mission of maintaining world peace. Second, NATO needs to 
legitim ize its third party intervention so as to not to be blamed for 
m ilita rily  intervening in conflicts in pursuit of the A llies ’ interests. This 
would put it into the position of a principal party which NATO is 
particu larly  avoiding. Thus, it adheres to the consent of the UN 
Security Council and the request by the UN Secretary General on a 
case-by-case basis.
Correspondingly, the possible third party roles that NATO can 
assume in con flic t management will be parallel to the UN’s which are 
generally outlined in Ghali's 'An Agenda For Peace'. The UN's roles 
as regards the d iffe ren t phases of conflict have been summarized in 
the second chapter. Furthermore, NATO's participation in the conflict 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in line with its adaptation to the conflict
management since 1991 has been handled in the third chapter. On the 
basis of the conflic t analysis in the second chapter and the roles that 
NATO took in its intervention in this conflict , here possible third party 
roles that NATO could assume in international conflic t management 
will be handled.
There are four general categories in which NATO might take 
active role: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peace-enforcem ent 
and peace-making.(See Chart 3) Preventive diplomacy aims at 
preventing a potential conflic t escalate into a crisis, or should it is on 
crisis phase, to a war .It is practiced at e ither the pre-crisis or the 
crisis phases of a conflict. Ghali foresees five types of action to 
serve at preventive diplomacy: confidence build ing measures, formal 
and informal fact-find ing, early warning, preventive deployment and 
the creation of dem ilitarized zones.''
In promoting confidence building measures, NATO has devised 
po litica l forums such as the North A tlantic Cooperation Council 
(NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (P for P) schemes where the 
system atic exchange of political and m ilitary information take place. 
However they are part of the political approach. NATO has little  to do 
in fact find ing missions compared to the established mechanisms of 
the UN in this regard. As far as early warning is concerned NATO can 
be particu larly serviceable with its advanced inte lligence and 
reconnaissance systems. This function has utmost importance for 
m ilitary and environmental activities in issue areas.2
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In the category of preventive diplomacy, preventive deployment 
and the monitoring of demilitarized zones are the tasks that NATO 
could forcibly contribute. The concept of the deployment of 
multinational forces in a preventive mode, as a means of both 
deterring cross-border (inter-state) attacks and preventing hostilities 
from erupting within a country, has long been advocated by observers 
as well as UN officials. This kind of deployment has been firstly 
implemented in Macedonia along the border with Albania and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia since December 1992.  ^ Although 
NATO did not participate in the mission in Macedonia, it could 
adequately perform such a function in case of a request because the 
Alliance's forces are being re-designed for providing stand-by forces 
for this purpose. It is among the tasks of the Combined Joint Task 
Forces (CJTF). Similar to preventive deployment, defending de­
militarized zones serves as a means of separating potential 
belligerents at the request of one party. It can be significant in 
demonstrating the international community's concern that conflict be 
prevented there. NATO's involvement in monitoring such zones 
through its advanced military reconnaissance techniques and the 
deployment of troops could be determining (see Chart 3)
Peace-making activities entail the responsibility of seeking to 
bring the hostile parties peacefully to the terms by means of the 
techniques listed in Chapter VI of the UN Charter. These actions can 
be employed at the first three stages of conflict- pre-crisis, crisis, and 
war, aiming at reaching a new political settlement (see Chart 3). The
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record of the UN has shown that as to the lack of political will by the 
parties, the lack of enough leverage by the third parties or the 
indifference by the international community has made the peaceful 
means of conflict settlement unsuccessful. Therefore the Secretary 
General suggested the mixture of different conflict management 
methods ranging from adjudication to resort of force in "An Agenda 
For Peace". These methods are bringing the issue before the 
International Court of Justice, working for improvement of the 
conditions leading to conflict, the imposition of sanctions under Art. 
41 of the UN Charter and the use of force in accordance with Art. 42.
In the implementation of the peace-making actions which 
ultimately targets to reach a peace agreed by the parties, NATO can 
play a role in the monitoring of the sanctions including the use of 
force against a declared aggressor. In the implementation of the 
economic embargo against the former Yugoslavian states and the 
arms embargo against Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO has 
carried out such a monitoring function. Moreover, it plays a credible 
role in the monitoring of the no-fly-zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
NATO has also assumed a new role in international peace­
making efforts. This is contingency planning for a political settlement 
in the conflict in former Yugoslavia. It is a category of action which 
brings NATO's political and military capabilities together at the 
disposal of UN authority. This role is remarkable in terms of potential 
conflicts in Europe. Such plans prepared and discussed by the parties 
before they resort to aggression can be very functional in coordination
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with the UN authorities. Such a work seems more active and credible 
than similar attempts initiated by the OSCE which could not go 
beyond a diplomatic meeting forum. Furthermore, such a plan would 
combine the military and political experience of NATO under the 
impartial framework provided by the UN. Thus potential conflicts can 
be dealt with more properly before they transcend into full-scale wars.
As indicated earlier peace-keeping has been invented by the 
United Nations. It is the deployment of the UN troops in field aimed at 
preventing the outbreak or resurgence of aggression between the 
parties. Peace-keeping activities have been guided by the principles 
of non-use of force except self-defense, consent of parties, 
impartiality and being conducted under the UN Security Council 
authority. Various collective peace-keeping operations can be carried 
out during the war and post-war phases of a conflict (see Chart 3). 
During a war peace-keeping troops can disengage the warring parties 
through their physical existence in the field. They do not use force 
except self-defense. This traditional peace-keeping function i.e. to 
support peace-making efforts by helping to create conditions in which 
political negotiation can proceed, involves monitoring of cease-fires, 
controlling buffer zones and so on.
Increase in demand for the peace-keeping troops and the 
changing nature of conflicts particularly civil ones have constituted 
new tasks for the peace-keeping troops in the field. Maintenance of 
the delivery of humanitarian relief is the most significant new function
56
that peacekeeping troops are expected to perform. Specifically, at the
post-war phase of a conflict peacekeeping troops are required for;
"demobilization of the troops; the destruction of 
weapons and the formation and training of new armed 
forces; monitoring existing police force and forming 
new ones; supervising or even controlling existing 
administrations; verifying respect for human rights, 
observing, supervising or even conducting elections; 
undertaking information campaigns to explain the 
settlement the opportunities it offers the people 
concerned and the role of the United Nations".·^
NATO's third party intervention to the European conflicts in form 
of peacekeeping is prominent. All NATO documents refer to peace­
keeping as a major form of the third party intervention it aspires to 
perform. Actually the 1991 Oslo Decision and December 1992 
documents respectively put NATO's assets into the service of the 
OSCE and UN in peacekeeping operations. NATO can support the UN 
peace-keeping operations in logistic and procurement activities in the 
performance of all these functions. It can particularly be functional in 
providing troops for the traditional peacekeeping functions, that is the 
delivery of humanitarian relief and the monitoring of cease-fires. In 
other words NATO can be more effective in the peace-keeping 
operations conducted during the war phase. Whereas in the post-war 
phase of a conflict peace-keeping activities require a more sensitive 
approach since the third party should be genuinely impartial in the 
eyes of the principal parties to the conflict for the success of an 
operation. Despite its functioning under the auspices of the UN , 
NATO could still be considered the security instrument of the Western 
powers hence the parties may not be willing to host NATO troops in
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their territories after a political settlement is reached. Therefore 
NATO's third party involvement in international conflict whether it be 
inter-state or intra-state ought to be halted after the settlement is 
reached.
Peace enforcement is a newly emerged concept developed by 
the UN due to the practical requirements that UN peacekeeping forces 
have confronted in the course of their post-cold war involvement such 
as Somalia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Some scholars analyze peace- 
enforcement as a part of the peace-keeping activities where UN forces 
are authorized to use force except self- defense. Whereas in Ghali's 
categorization peace-enforcement is considered as a part of 
peacemaking activity. Ghali mentions that the peace-enforcement 
activity requires when agreed cease fires are not complied with. He 
states that when
"the UN has been called upon to send forces to restore 
and maintain a cease-fire this task can on occasion 
exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the 
expectations of peace-keeping force contributors and 
this is the peace-enforcement rather than 
peacekeeping."5
However in this study peace-enforcement has been treated as a 
separate category of conflict management. Indeed, the use of force, 
except self defense is viewed as distinct from the mission of 
peacemaking. Enforcement activity differs from peacemaking in that 
the third party conflict manager actively involves in war making 
activity at the expense of the impartiality principle against the violator 
of the cease-fire. In this respect this study completely agrees with
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Ghali’s definition of peacekeeping, however, here, it is not considered 
as peacemaking activity because the latter serves to bring hostile 
parties around a table through peaceful means not through the use of 
force.
Peace-enforcement activity can be restored at the war phase of 
a conflict since any violation of truce is treated as the resumption of a 
war (see Chart 3). Peace-enforcement ultimately aims at preparing 
proper ground for effective functioning of the peace making efforts by 
principal and third parties.
In describing the peace-enforcement activity Ghali continues
that
"such units from Member States would be available on 
call and would consist of troops that have volunteered 
for such service, have to be more heavily armed than 
peacekeeping forces and would need to undergo 
extensive preparatory training within their national
fo rces.....  The deployment and operation of such
forces would be under the authorization of the Security 
Council and would , as in the case of peace-keeping 
the Security Council be under the command of the 
Secretary- General."®
These assets that the peace-enforcement units ought to have in 
Ghali's categorization perfectly corresponds to the assets of NATO. 
NATO actually intended to set up such forces called Combined Joint 
Task Forces (CJTF) which would carry out such functions as well as 
peace-keeping and preventive deployment.
In effect, peace-enforcement is crucial from NATO's point of 
view. NATO carried out this mission once in the conflict in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina exactly in the way described by Ghali. NATO aircrafts
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launch air-strikes against the Serbs who violated the agreed cease­
fire on 18 February 1994. This confrontation was initiated in the form 
of NATO ultimatums which foresaw the use of air strikes against the 
violator of truce, the Serbs in this case. Undoubtedly, these strikes 
were launched under the authority of the UN in coordination with the 
UNPROFOR in Zagreb.
Peace-building actions theoretically start following the genuine 
settlement and aim at removing the real sources of a conflict. They 
are actually a part of the conflict resolution scheme since peace­
building activities should be launched at a pre-crisis phase or post 
war phase (see Chart 4). They target to remove the sources of 
conflict and put in action what differentiates the resolution from the 
management activities therefore they are not categorized as 
management activity.
Peace-building actions are, indeed, the most important phase of 
conflict resolution efforts for the "peacemaking and peace-keeping 
operations, to be truly successful". These are "comprehensive efforts 
to identify and support structures which will consolidate peace and 
advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people." All 
initiatives taken by either principal third parties are conditional upon 
the peace building efforts' credible handling of the real sources 
leading to the conflict.
"(Depending on the nature of the peace ) if it ends the 
a civil strife these activities may include disarming the 
previously warring parties and the restoration of order, 
the custody and possible destruction of weapons, 
repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for
6 0
security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing 
efforts to protect human rights, reforming or 
strengthening governmental institutions and promoting 
formal and informal processes of political participation. 
In the aftermath of international war post-conflict 
peace-building may take the form of concrete 
cooperative projects which link two or more countries 
in a mutually beneficial undertaking that can not only 
contribute to economic and social development but 
also enhance the confidence that is so fundamental to 
peace. "7
Peace-building actions can be launched at any phase of a 
conflict where hostile parties decide not to inflame the issue. If a 
conflict ends at a crisis phase then the parties de-escalate the 
situation to a new pre-crisis phase where peace-buiiding activities can 
be resorted to. Should a conflict reach to the war phase then peace­
building efforts can be utilized after genuine peace is reached through 
negotiations by the parties to a conflict.
"In surveying the range of efforts for peace, the 
concept of peace-building as the construction of a new 
environment should be viewed as the counterpart of 
preventive diplomacy, which seeks to avoid the 
breakdown of peaceful conditions. When conflict 
breaks out, mutually reinforcing efforts at peace­
making and peace-keeping come into play. Once these 
have achieved their objectives, only sustained 
cooperative work to deal with underlying economic 
,social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place 
an achieved peace on a durable foundation. 
Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict 
peace-building is to prevent recurrence."®
These efforts are vital for the real settlement of international conflicts.
Peace building is a kind of third party intervention mechanism
where NATO could not assume a role. Similar to the peace-keeping
efforts in the post-war, peace-building activities could not be
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performed by the NATO personnel because NATO forces would be 
viewed as the agents of Western powers and once more NATO would 
suffer from the problem of impartiality. Therefore, NATO actions 
under this category should be minimized compared to UN's which are 
more impartial in the eyes of conflicting parties.
NATO's intervention in the post-war phase of conflict would 
have additional side-effects. The peace-building attempts in the post­
war phase of a conflict would serve conflict resolution instead of 
conflict management. This is an area where NATO would not like to 
act in a form described by Ghali. It has political mechanisms like 
Partnership for Peace and NACC which target to manage conflicts 
before they burst into full fledged war. However initiatives taken in a 
post-war phase of a conflict would serve to resolve a conflict with its 
real sources where the political forums of NATO would not be 
sufficient. Even if NATO intends to get involved in such conflicts in 
the post war phase through its political mechanisms, this would make 
NATO a principal party into a conflict from which it particularly 
abstains.
This is an area of functioning in which NATO has never 
intended to take any initiative. Since the end of Cold War, the 
ultimate aim of NATO's transformation has always been to adjust the 
Alliance in conflict management rather than resolution. This is 
obvious in the official documents issued after that date.
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4.2 An Appra isa l of NATO's Possib le Th ird Party Roles Model from 
a S truc tu ra l Perspective
NATO's possible involvement in international conflict 
management as a third party is analyzed within a theoretical 
framework on the basis of the documents issued after the Cold War . 
However practice usually differs form theory. NATO has, actually, 
striven to perform such functions under considerable constraints 
which might sometimes be so influential that they might hinder the 
performance of such a role or create unavoidable problems. These 
constraints for the successful and credible third party intervention 
from NATO's point of view can be grouped into four: the impartiality 
problem, inadequate theoretical and practical preparation, structural 
problems between UN and NATO and the lack of political will among 
the Allies.
I) im pa rt ia l i ty :  One of the important constraints for regional 
organizations even when operating as a group on behalf of the UN is 
to maintain impartiality in the eyes of the parties to a particular 
d ispute."9 Particularly for NATO having more than 45 years of
experience as a defense organization of the Western bloc it is almost 
impossible to justify its involvement in a conflict on its own behalf free 
from connotations of partiality. This deficiency is actually one of the 
principal advantages of the UN as a vehicle for collective action. The 
UN has been able to disassociate itself as an intervening force from 
the politics of a particular conflict, thus preserve its impartial status. 
NATO officials keeping this in mind chose to act within the functioning
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area delineated by the UN and used the UN's offer for action in order
to provide the required legitimacy.
Yet the UN's offer to act might not be sufficient. For instance
NATO's air strikes against the Serbs on 18 February 1994 were
criticized by the Russian Federation. This indicates that if similar
cases occur in Eastern or Central Europe Russia will most likely to
react similarly and attempt to direct the world public opinion to take a
negative stand against such intervention.
ii) Inadequate theo re tica l and p rac t ica l p repara tion : An
intervention to an international conflict as a third party needs a well
prepared guideline for action. Firstly, principles should be established
at the theoretical level. The principles and norms on which such action
would be based should be searched and determined beforehand.
Following these principles and norms, rules and the decision making
procedures should be d e t e r m i n e d . F i n a l l y ,  after the implementation
of these principles, rules and norms the failures and deficiencies
faced in action should constitute feedback to the international conflict
management regime of this institution to develop a well equipped and
adequate functioning of a regime. NATO's preparation to the
international conflict management regime as a third party does not
suffer from the lack of well established principles. They were explicitly
stated in the Alliance Strategic Concept in 1991. The basic principles
are enumerated as "the fundamental tasks of Allies". They are;
" to preserve peace ....and provide for effective 
defense; an overall capability to manage successfully 
crises affecting the security of its members and the
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pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other 
nations and the active search of a cooperative 
approach to European security, including in the field of 
arms control and disarmament."··
The norms are stated as the protection of peace in Europe, 
dialogue, cooperation, collective defense, management of crisis and 
conflict prevention under the heading of " A Broad Approach to 
Security". '•2 Naturally, a general strategic concept does not go 
beyond the principles and norms level. The rules and the decision 
making procedures were to be created in the following meetings of the 
established mechanisms of the Alliance. Even though such a 
tendency is observed in several decisions following 1991 document 
they failed to give clear cut definitions of the rules applied in the 
conflict management as a third party. For example NATO decided to 
put its assets under the aegis of the UN and OSCE peacekeeping 
activities without specifying in which cases or under which 
circumstances peacekeeping or peace enforcement or any kind of 
third party intervention mechanisms would be launched. Finally, the 
decision-making procedures between NATO and the UN or OSCE have 
not been established.
In spite of the lack of predetermined criteria for involvement 
along with delegating final authority for intervention to the UN or 
OSCE mandates theoretically which constitutes a problem, this 
vagueness is in the interest of the NATO countries which would not 
like to assume such a role in the management of conflicts. That seems 
the reason why NATO strategists prefer to design such a regime. It 
supplies NATO with the luxury of being selective. This a political tact
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which expands NATO's area of operation. The "separable but not 
separate forces” principle which enables the Allies as well as partners 
to individually detach themselves from collective actions of NATO in 
conflict management is a reflection of this political maneuver in the 
military field.
i i i)  S truc tu ra l prob lem s between the UN and NATO; This
constitutes one of the primary failures in practice. Even if NATO
decided to actively involve in conflicts to prevent the harsh violations
of human rights or to prevent the human sufferings in various
situations during the Bosnia conflict, the UN Security Council
hesitated to let NATO to undertake enforcement action against the
obvious aggressor. A consensus between the UN and NATO could not
be achieved on time, since the definite terms of intervention in
conflicts did not determined between Brussels and New York due to
the different political considerations of respective member countries.
Accordingly the aggression could not be stopped at the shortest
possible time. This failure is explicitly stated by the former Secretary
General of the NATO as follows:
"We must further develop the Alliance's capabilities, 
forces, structures and procedures for crisis 
management, peacekeeping, and peacemaking . And 
we must achieve a more structured relationship with 
the United Nations in order to generate the conditions 
that are essential for future crisis between 
humanitarian and peacekeeping-peacemaking 
missions, and unitary chain of command.
NATO's declaration of intention stating that it is ready to supply 
air coverage or strikes against aggressor Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina
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where defenseless civilian Muslims were attacked on 5 February and 
18 April 1994 were the typical examples of such failures in terms of 
processes leading to these ultimatums.
Besides the theoretical unreadiness for a credible third party 
intervention, NATO has not been equipped with the necessary tools 
for intervention. The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which are 
intended to be formed and trained for a credible third party 
intervention mechanisms have not been fully developed.
iv) The lack o f p o l it ica l w il l:  The most important failure of 
NATO's third party involvement in international conflicts which has 
reflections on all other problems appears as the lack of political will 
among the Allies. The past record of intra-alliance consultation, even 
conducted under the shadow of the Soviet power, suggests that the 
possibility of NATO members , let alone NATO and its Eastern 
European partners , disagreeing on specific policy issues is extremely 
high. In reality, NATO does not remotely resemble a great power , 
with well-defined interests over a range of issues and a well- 
developed will of its own. Each major European power and the USA 
has its own interests and concerns ; what Germany deems as vital to 
its security and prosperity, the USA or France may regard as 
peripheral. To insist on jo int intervention in such a case would only 
create friction where none previously existed.'''*
It is evident that the lack of political will is closely tied to deep 
seated apprehensions, especially among Western governments about 
becoming embroiled in open-ended commitments that may involve
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high casualty rates and substantial economic costs. It remains very 
d ifficu lt for any government to justify why its own nationals should die 
in distant land for causes not clearly related to perceptions of national 
interest, especially when the conflicting parties themselves appear to 
show little interest in peace resolutions. It is important to stress that 
unpalatable prospect of 'open-ended commitments' and unacceptable 
casualty rates is a particularly important consideration in US policy 
and therefore likely to decisively influence all future third party 
involvement especially in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping 
operations.
From the US point of view, the reluctance in taking more active 
role in overseas engagements can be clearly seen in the Clinton 
administration's new policy in peacekeeping operations. This policy 
orders that the following elements will guide the US involvement in 
possible deployments of US military units in UN operations; very well 
defined threat to interests of US; existence of distinct end point; 
equitable sharing of peace operations' costs and well designed plan 
for carrying out peace operations e f f e c t i v e l y . T h e s e  elements 
clearly demonstrate that US being the sole superpower which is 
expected to take the lead in initiation of conflict management in the 
world is putting tougher conditions for participation to UN operations 
in the world. It is even tougher for US administrations to persuade the 
public and the Congress to embroil in conflicts in Europe where 
Europeans want to assert their own defense and security identity as a
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reaction to US presence in the continent since end of the Second 
World War.
Despite all these negative attributes, in view of the theoretical 
framework outlined in the first part of this chapter. NATO could still 
play a credible third party role in international conflict management 
particularly in comparison to other security organizations. A 
successful third party conflict management by international 
organizations as third party requires some unique assets that NATO 
possesses. They can be described as follows:
i) To be a reg ional o rgan iza tion ; In comparison with the UN, 
NATO has the advantage of being a regional organization so it does 
not suffer from the mismatch between the means and mandates as 
much as the UN does. Mats Berdal specifies UN's problem in this 
regard as follows:
"The former concerns the discrepancy between 
decisions made in New York and the provision of 
resources to effect them. More than 40 resolutions and 
no less than 15 mandate enhancements had been 
adopted since the Vance Plan [for the Bosnia- 
Herzegovina problem] was approved by the Security 
Council on 21 February 1992. This had placed 
impossible demands on UNPROFOR and has 
generated legitimate criticism form field personnel to 
the effect that the Security Council treats resolutions 
as if there were sold -executing."‘'®
NATO has institutionally lesser problems in the sense that its 
area of functioning is limited with Europe though its borders is not 
defined. Thus, NATO can abstain from some conflicts provided that 
they do not pose direct threats to the core interests of the Allies or 
Peace Partners. However, the UN as a global security organization is
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expected to find solutions to all international conflicts in the world. 
NATO officia ls act prudently in rendering decisions for action. Since 
NATO delegated its final authority in intervening into a conflict to the 
UN, the responsibility of taking final decision for the imposition of the 
sanctions rests on the UN.
ii) To be the key forum for coordinating and harmonizing 
transatlantic policies in conflict management efforts: NATO brings 
US and Europe together in spite of the existing friction among them. 
This transatlantic relationship is still the most stable geopolitical asset 
in the world for the management of an international conflict. NATO 
provides the key forum for coordinating and harmonizing transatlantic 
policies in the broadest sense. The Atlantic Alliance has also put the 
Europeans together. The American presence has provided for a stable 
balance between former rivals and enemies. It has not only prevented 
them from fighting each other but also enabled them to put their 
efforts together for the management of conflicts.
iii) To have a stabilizing influence in Europe: NATO, as a 
strong alliance embracing various states in the region, by its very 
existence exerts a stabilizing influence around its periphery. This is 
particularly significant in pre-crisis phases of conflicts. According to a 
study conducted by the Oxford Research Group in 1992 62 potential 
and active conflicts exist in E u r o p e . T h e  mere existence of NATO 
as well as its intention to develop an effective conflict management 
regime might constitute a deterring factor for the parties. Most 
probably the absence of a possibility of third party intervention by
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NATO under UN auspices would dramatically increase the risks of 
conflicts in Europe.
iv) To be a powerfu l p o l i t ic o -m i l i ta ry  ins trum ent; As regards 
the need for an effective management of the major conflicts, it is clear 
that diplomacy should be backed by a powerful politico-military 
instrument. Certainly, NATO requires the political will of its members 
to act. However, once the political will to act is reached NATO 
becomes a very effective instrument for action since no other 
institution can offer such an integrated structure for politico-military 
consultation mechanisms as well as unique military capabilities which 
still make the difference between success and failure.^®
In terms of military capabilities, NATO remains unique in 
possessing an integrated structure with uniform command, control and 
communications procedures, collective assets and infrastructure 
facilities. Equally significant , NATO also possesses both a tested 
decision-making structure and a contingency-planning mechanism 
which can respond to changing mandates and developments on the 
ground. Accordingly, NATO might increase the effectiveness of UN 
mechanisms and structures for military actions and field support. 
Owing to the 45 years of experience of its integrated military structure 
NATO has already overcome problems such as from logistics and 
procurement: command, control and communications training and 
quality of staff that UN troops suffer.
In sum an effective conflict management for the future conflicts 
in Europe depends on close cooperation between the UN and NATO.
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They can complement each other for securing peace and stability in 
the region. Therefore this study attempts to develop a model for 
NATO's possible intervention to the conflict management regime in a 
complementary manner to the UN's. The model foresees several third 
party roles at the different phases of a conflict ranging from 
preventive deployment to the use of force against an aggressor.
To assess the practicability of the model possible problems that 
NATO might confront are grouped as the impartiality problem, 
theoretical and practical unreadiness, structural problems in 
coordinating intervention mechanisms with the UN and the lack of 
political will among the Allies. Nevertheless, NATO has some unique 
assets- like securing transatlantic cooperation, being a deterring 
factor, being a regional organization and possessing an integrated 
military structure- in comparison to other security organizations for an 
effective international conflict management. In conclusion if NATO 
manages to overcome these problems it might develop an effective 
conflict management regime of its own. The model developed here is 
a kind of speculation on the forms which NATO's possible intervention 
can be in the future conflicts in Europe.
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CONCLUSION
In this study, designing a new role for NATO in the emerging 
security landscape in the post-Cold War Europe has been treated as a 
third party intervention to the international conflicts. NATO's 
involvement in European conflicts has been theoretically categorized 
as a third party intervention because the demise of the Soviet Union 
remarkably reduced the likelihood of NATO's being a principal party to 
a conflict in the region. A NATO, which intends to preserve peace and 
stability in Europe, could only be involved in the conflicts outside of 
its territory, as a third party. This new perspective to NATO's role in 
European security requires an impartial intervention which could be 
obtained under UN auspices.
The concepts partly foreseen in the Charter, partly derived 
form the UN practices have constituted the general framework for 
regional organizations such as NATO according to which it could 
operate. These are grouped as preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, 
peace-making, peace-enforcement and peace-building.
The roles that NATO could assume as a third party under these 
categories are also differentiated in relation to the several phases of 
a conflict, such as pre-crisis, crisis, war and post-war. With the 
combination of these analyses, a model which is illustrated in Chart 3 
is derived. From a review of the model following consequences can 
drawn: First, NATO can participate in conflict management in Europe 
in a complementary manner to the UN's engagement because the UN
provides NATO the required impartiality and legitimacy. NATO's 
independent political approach to conflict management which is 
embodied in the NACC and the Partnership for Peace are no 
exception to this generalization due to the fact that in such forums 
NATO is a principal party, not a third party. Second, the crucial factor 
that makes the difference for NATO's involvement as a third party is 
its military force backed by the support of the 16 nations among whom 
some of the strongest nations of world politics exist. Third, though 
NATO can intervene in conflicts in all categories of action as a third 
party, its remarkable contribution could take place in the performance 
of peace-enforcement and peace-keeping in war phase, and the 
preventive deployment of troops in the pre-crisis where it could more 
effectively make use of its integrated military structure.. Finally, NATO 
cannot act in the area of peace-building because peace-building 
efforts are the part of conflict resolution initiatives which aspire to 
remove sources of conflict. This is an area that NATO has not 
preferred to operate in.
An evaluation of the possibility of successfully performing the 
roles foreseen in the model has revealed that there are two factors: 
First, a genuine commitment and common political will of its members 
should be secured before NATO's involvement. Second a general 
design for an effective conflict management regime in Europe ought to 
be handled in depth within NATO, along with clearly determining the 
terms of coordination with the UN. The absence of a clear rule of
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conduct arranging the relation between the two reduces the possibility 
of success.
In general, the aim of NATO's third party conflict management 
model is to create an immature outline of the possible roles which 
NATO could assume. This model and its critics can be accepted as the 
main contribution of this study because it is a synthesis of all the 
concepts and cases under consideration. It is designed to contribute 
to the discussions on the practicability and attainability of NATO's new 
role within the existing structures. This study has also presented some 
of the arguments while it assesses the deficiencies and strengths of 
NATO in performing such roles.
As this study is produced, there exists no similar published work 
written from such a point of view. Therefore this is initiated as an 
attempt to bring the theoretical model of third party intervention and 
NATO's possible involvement in the conflicts in Europe together. 
However, it has been handicapped by two constraints which disabled 
the writer to give a more detailed picture of the subject. First, the 
information on NATO's conflict management role in Europe could not 
be accessed easily owing to its military character. Second NATO 
practice in the management of conflicts is restricted to only one 
example. Making generalizations on the basis of a unique case can be 
a strong point of criticism. However as mentioned earlier this study is 
just an attempt to look at such an issue from an already existing 
theoretical view and to add an embryonic model to be challenged and 
criticized.
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CHARTER Of THE UNITED NATIONS 
CHAPTER VI
PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF
DISPUTES
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuaixe of which is likely to erxlanger the maintenance of international 
peace arxl security, shall, first of ail, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration. Judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such
means.
Article 34
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or 
give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35
1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to In Article 
34, to the attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly.
2. A state which Is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of 
the General Assembly any dispute to which It is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the 
obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will 
be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.
Article 36
1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of 
like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which 
have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that 
legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice In accordance with 
the provisions of the Statute of the Court.
Article 37
1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle It by the means indicated In 
that Article, they shall refer It to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the 
maintenance of international peace and security, It shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend 
such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.
Article 38
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute 
so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.
APPENDIX I
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CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS 
TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE 
PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articie 41 and 
42 to maintain or restore international peace and security
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply 
NVith such provisional measures as It deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice 
to the rights, claims, or positions of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall dully take account of failure to 
comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide vvtiat measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to 
give effect to Its decisions, and It may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may 
Include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other 
means of communications, and the severance of diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have 
proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore 
International peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or 
land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, In order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and 
security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or 
agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of the 
maintaining international peace and security
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and 
general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security 
Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and 
groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on 
It to provide armed forces In fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43. invite that Member, if the Member so 
desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that 
Member's armed forces.
Article 45
In order to enable to United Nations to take urgent military measures. Members shall hold Immediately available 
national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of 
these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special
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agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff 
Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the applications of the armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the 
Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all 
questions relating to the Security CourKifs military requirements for the maintenance of intemationai peace and security, 
the employment and command of the forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible 
disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security 
Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall 
be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities 
requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any 
armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be 
worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, wit the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with 
appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of intemationai 
peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council 
may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in 
the appropriate International agencies of which they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out of the measures 
decided upon by the Security Council.
Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, 
whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds Itself confronted with special economic problems arising from 
the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those 
problems.
Article 51
Noting in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right individual or collective self-defense if an armed 
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken rr»easures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security .Measures taken by Members In the exercise of this right of self-defense shall 
be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not In any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as It deems necessary In order to maintain or 
restore International peace and security.
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CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regiortal arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, 
provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering Into such arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such 
regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the Initiative of the states concerned or by reference from 
the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the applications of Articles 34 and 35.
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for 
enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy 
state as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed 
against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of ant such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of 
the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second 
World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.
Article 54
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under 
regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
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AN AGENDA FOR PEACE 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali
I. Definitions
The term preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping are integrally related and used in this report 
are defined as follows:
- Preventive diplomacy is action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to 
prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter 
v^en they occur.
- Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such 
peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.
- Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto 
with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military 
and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well. Peace-keeping is a technique that 
expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace.
The present report in addition will address the critically related concept of post-conflict peace-building action 
to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse Into conflict. 
Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required 
to halt conflicts and preserve peace once It is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict 
peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples.
These four areas for action, taken together, and carried our with the backing of all Members, offer a coherent 
contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter. The United Nations has extensive experience not only in 
these fields, but in the v/ider realm of work for peace in which these four fields are set. Initiatives on decolonization, on 
the environment and sustainable development, on population, on the eradication of disease, on disarmament and on the 
growth of international law - these and many others have contributed immeasurably to the foundations for a peaceful 
world. The world has often been rent by conflict and plagued by massive human suffering and deprivation. Yet It would 
have been far more so without the continuing efforts of the United Nations. This wide experience must be taken Into 
account In assessing the potential of the United Nations in maintaining international security not only in Its traditional 
sense, but in the new dimensions presented by the era ahead.
VII. Cooperation with regional arrangements and organizations.
The Covenant of the League of Nations, in Its Article 21, noted the validity of regional understandings for 
securing the maintain of peace. The Charter devotes Chapter VII. to regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with 
such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and 
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The cold war impaired the proper use of Charter VIII. 
and indeed. In that era, regional arrangements worked on occasion against resolving disputes In the manner foreseen In 
the Charter.
The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing 
useful flexibility for undertakings by a groups of States to deal vrith a matter appropriate for regional action which also 
could contribute to the maintenance of International peace and security. Such associations or entities could include treaty- 
based organizations,, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, regional organizations for mutual
A P P E N D IX  II
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security and defense, organizations for general regional development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or 
functions, and groups created to deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.
In this regard, the United Nations has recently encouraged a rich variety of complementary efforts. Just as no 
two regions or situations are the same, so the design of cooperative work and its division of labor must adapt to the 
realities of each cases with flexibility arxl creativity. In Africa, three different regional groups-the Organizations of African 
Unity, the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference- joined efforts with the United Nations 
regarding Somalia. In the Aslan context. Association of South-East Asian Nations and individuai States from several 
regions were brought together with the parties to the Cambodian conflict at an international conference In Paris, to work 
with the United Nations. For El Salvador, a unique arrangement- "The Friends of the Secretary -Generar-contributed to 
agreements reached through the mediation of the Secretary-General. The end of the war in Nicaragua involved a highly 
complex effort which was initiated by leaders of the regions and conducted by individual States, groups of States and the 
Organization of American States. Efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the 
support of States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, have been of central Importance 
in dealing Vi^h the crisis in the Balkans and neighboring areas.
In the past, regional arrangements often were created because of the absence of a universal system for 
collective security; thus their activities could on occasion work at cross-purposes with the sense of solidarity required for 
the effectiveness of the world Organization. But in this new era of opportunity, regional arrangements of agencies can 
render great service if their activities are undertaken in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the 
Charter, and if their relationship with the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council,, is governed by Chapter 
VIII.
It Is not the purpose of the present report to set forth any formal pattern of relationship between regional 
organizations and the United Nations, or to call for any specific division of labor. What is dear, however, is that regional 
arrangements or agencies in many cases possess a potential that should be utilized in serving the functions covered In 
this report: preventive diplomacy, peace-keeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peace-building. Under the Charter, the 
Security Council has and will continue to have primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, but 
regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only 
lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization In 
International affairs.
Regional arrangements and agencies have not In recent decades been considered in this light, even when 
originally designed in part for a role in maintaining or restoring peace within their regions of the world. Today a new sense 
exists that they have contributions to make. Consultations between the United Nations and regior^l arrangements or 
agencies could do much to build international consensus on the nature of a problem and the measures required to 
address it. Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with United Nations in joint undertakings would 
encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize 
a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the 
weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward In the spirit of the Charter, And as 
envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being 
encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining International peace and security, it being essential to continue to 
recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council.
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THE ALLIANCE’S STRATEGIC CONCEPT
Agreed by the Heads of State and Government 
participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council in Rome on 7th-8th November 1991
APPENDIX III
1. At their meeting in London in July 1990, NATO’s Heads of State and Government agreed on the need to 
transform the Atlantic Alliance to reflect the new, more promising, era In Europe. While reaffirming the basic principles on 
which the Alliance has rested since its inception, they recognized that the developments taking place in Europe would 
have a far-reaching impact on the way In which Its aims would be met in future. In particular, they set In hand a 
fundamental strategic review. The resulting new Strategic Concept Is set out below.
PART I- THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
The New Strategc Environment
2. Since 1989, profound political changes have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe which have radically 
improved the security environment In which the North Atlantic Alliance seeks to achieve its objectives. The USSR's former 
satellites have fully recovered their sovereignty. The Soviet Union and its Republics are undergoing radical change. The 
three Baltic Republics have regained their independence. Soviet forces have left Hungary and Czechoslovakia and are 
due to complete their withdrawal from Poland and Germany by 1994. All the countries that were formerly adversaries of 
NATO have dismantled the Warsaw Pact and rejected ideological hostility to the West. They have. In varying degrees 
embraced and begun to implement policies aimed at achieving pluralistic democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights 
and market economy. The political division of Europe that was source of military confrontation of the Cold War period has 
thus been overcome.
3. In the West, there have also been significant changes. Germany has been united remains the full member of 
the Alliance and of European institutions. The fact that the countries of European Community are working tov^rds the 
goal of political union, including the development of a European security identity; and the enhancement of the role of the 
WEU are important factors for European security. The strengthening of security dimension in the process of European 
integration and the enhancement of the role and responsibilities of European members of the Alliance are positive 
mutually reinforcing. The development of European security identity and defense role reflected in the strengthening of the 
European pillar within the Alliance, will not only serve the interests of the European states but also reinforce integrity and 
effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.
4. Substantial progress In arms control has already enhanced stability and security by lowering arms levels and 
increasing military transparency and mutual confidence (including through the Stockholm CDE Agreement of 1986, the 
INF Treaty of 1987 and the CSCE Agreement and Confidence and Security Building Measures of 1990). Implementation 
of the 1991 START Treaty will lead to increased stability through substantial and balanced reductions In the field of 
strategic nuclear arms. Further far-reaching changes and reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States and the 
Soviet Union will be persuaded following President Bush's September 1991 initiative also of great Importance Treaty on 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) signed at 1990 Paris Summit; its implementation will remove the Alliance's 
numerical Inferiority in key conventional weapons systems and provide for effective verification procedures. All these 
developments will also result In an unprecedented of military transparency In Europe, thus Increasing predictability and 
mutual confidence. Such transparency would be further changed by the achievement of an OPEN SKIES regime. There 
are welcome prospects for further advances in arms control in conventional and nuclear forces, and for the achievement 
of a global ban on chemical weapons, as well as restricting de-stabilizing arms exports and proliferation of certain 
weapons technologies.
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5. The CSCE process which began in Helsinki in 1975, has already contributed significantly overcoming the 
division of Europe. As a result of Paris Summit it now includes new institutional arrangements and provides contractual 
framework for consultation and cooperation that can play a constructive role, complementary to that of NATO and the 
process of European Integration in preserving peace.
6. The historic changes that have occurred in Europe, which have led to the fulfillment of a number of 
objectives set out In the Harmel Report, have significantly improved the overall security of Allies. The monolithic, massive 
and potentially immediate threat which was the principal concern of the Alliance in its first 40 years has disappeared. On 
the other hand, a great deal of uncertainty about the future and risks to the security of the Alliance remain.
7. The New Strategic Concept looks forward to security environment in v^ich the positive changes referred to 
above have come to fruition. In particular, it assumes both the completion of the planned withdrawal of Soviet military 
forces from Central arxl Eastern Europe arxJ the full implementation by all parties of the 1990 CFE Treaty. The 
implementation of the Strategic Cor>cept will thus be kept under review In the light of the evolving security environment 
and in particular progress in fulfilling these assumptions. Further adaptation will be made to the extent necessary.
Security Challenges and Risks
8. The security challenges and risks which NATO faces are different In nature from what they were In the past. 
The threat of simultaneous full-scale attack on all of NATO’s European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no 
longer provides the focus for Allied strategy. Particularly In Central Europe the risk of surprise attack has been 
substantially reduced and minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly.
9. In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in 
nature multi-directional which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such 
risks if stability in Europe and security of Alliance members are to be preserved. The risks can arise in various way.
10. Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, 
but rather from the adverse consequences of Instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political 
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The tensions which may result as long as they remain limited should not directly threaten the security and 
territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crisis Inimical to European stability and even to 
armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct impact on security 
of Alliance.
11. The particular case of the Soviet Union, the risks and uncertainties that accompany the process of change 
cannot be seen In isolation from the fact that Its conventional forces are significantly larger than those of any other 
European state and Its large nuclear arsenal comparable only with that of the US. These capabilities have to be taken into 
account If stability and security in Europe are to be preserved.
12. The Allies also wish to maintain peaceful and non-adversarlal relations with the countries in the Southern 
Mediterranean and Middle East. The stability and peace of the countries on the Southern periphery of Europe are 
important for the security of the Alliance, as 1991 Gulf War has shown. This is all the more so because of the build up of 
military power and the proliferation of weapons technologies in the area, including weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missiles capable of reaching the territory of some member states of the Alliance.
13. Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction would be covered by the Article 5 
and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However the Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance 
security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for 
consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of their 
efforts Including their responses to such risks.
14. From the point of view of the Alliance strategy, these different risks have to be seen in different ways. Even 
in a norvadversarial and cooperative relationship, Soviet military capability and build-up potential including Its nuclear 
dimension, still constitute the most significant factor of which the Alliance has to take account in maintaining the right 
strategic balance in Europe. The end of East-West confrontation has, however, greatly reduced the risk of major conflict 
in Europe. On the other hand there Is a greater risk of crises arising, which could develop quickly v/ould require a rapid 
response, but they are likely to be of a lesser magnitude.
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15. Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of the strategic context. The first is that the new 
environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring 
validity. The second, on the other hand is that the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frarrie 
its strategy within a broad approach to security.
PART II- ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY 
FUNCTIONS
The Purpose of the AMance
16. NATO's essential purpose, set out In the Washington Treaty and reiterated In the London Declaration, is to 
safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of 
the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has 
worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective 
remains unchanged.
The Nature of the ASIance
17. NATO embodies the transatlantic link by which the security of North America is permanently tied to the 
security of Europe. It is the practical expression of effective collective effort among its members in support of their 
common interests.
18. The fundamental operating principle of the Alliance is that of common commitment and mutual cooperation 
among sovereign states in support of the indivisibility of security for all of its members. Solidarity within the Alliance, given 
substance and effect by NATO’s daily work in both the political and military spheres ensures that no single Ally is forced 
to rely upon its own national efforts alone in dealing with basic security challenges. Without depriving member states of 
their right and due to assume their sovereign responsibilities in the field of defense. The Alliance enables them through 
collective effort to enhance their ability to realize their essential national security objectives.
19. The resulting sense of equal security amongst the members of the Alliance regardless of the differences in 
their circumstances or in their national military capabilities relative to each other, contributes to overall stability within 
Europe and thus to the creation of conditions conducive to increased cooperation both among Alliance members and with 
others. It is on this basis that members of the Alliance, together with other nations are able to pursue the development of 
cooperative structures of security for a Europe whole and free.
The Fundamental Tasks of the Alliance
20. The means by which the Alliance pursues Its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include 
the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; and overall capability 
to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with 
other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control 
and disarmament.
21. To achieve Its essential purpose, the Alliance performs the following security tasks:
I. To provide one of the Indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the 
growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country 
would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to Impose hegemony through the threat or use of 
force.
II. To serve, as provided for In Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied 
consultations on any issues that affect the vital interests, Including possible developments posing risks for 
members' security, and for appropriate coordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.
III. To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
IV. To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.
22. Other European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in accordance with 
their responsibilities and purposes, in these fields. The creation of a European identity In security and defense will 
underline the preparedness of the European to a greater share of responsibility for their security and will help to reinforce
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transatlantic solidarity. However the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives NATO a particular position in 
that it can perform ail four core security functions. NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the 
forum for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members under the Washington 
T reaty.
23. In defining the core functions of the Alliance in the terms set out above, member states confirm that the 
scope of the Alliance as well as their rights and obligations as provided for in the Washington Treaty remain unchanged.
PART III- A BROAD APPROACH TO SECURITY 
Protecting Peace in a New Europe
24. The Alliance has always sought to achieve its objectives of safeguarding the security and territorial Integrity 
of Its members and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order In Europe, through both political and military means. 
This comprehensive approach remains the basis of the Alliance's security policy.
25. But what Is new is that, with the radical changes In the security situation, the opportunities for achlevirig 
Alliance objectives through political means are greater than ever before. It is now possible to draw ail the consequerices 
from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social environmental elements as well as the 
indispensable defense dimension. Managing the diversity of challenges facing the Alliance requires a broad approach to 
security. This is reflected in three mutually reinforcing elements of Allied security policy; dialogue, cooperation and the 
maintenance of defense capability.
26. The Alliance active pursuit of dialogue and cooperation, underpinned by its commitment to an effective 
collective defense capability seeks to reduce the risks of conflict arising out of misunderstanding or design; to build 
increased mutual understanding and confidence among all European states; to help manage crises affecting the security 
of the Allies; and to expand the opportunities for a genuine partnership among ail European countries in dealing with 
common security problems.
27. In this regard, the Alliance’s arms control and disarmament policy contributes both to dialogue and to 
cooperation with other nations, and thus will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security 
objectives. The Allies seek, through arms control and disarmament, to enhance security and stability at the lowest 
possible level of forces consistent with the requirements of defense. Thus, the Alliance will continue to ensure that 
defense and arms control and disarmament objectives remain In harmony.
28. In fulfilling its fundamental objectives and core security functions the Alliance will continue to respect the 
legitimate security interests of others, and seek the peaceful resolution of disputes as set forth In the Charter of the United 
Nations. The Alliance will promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions. In this 
respect, it recognizes the valuable contribution being made by other organizations such as the European Community and 
the CSCE, and that the roles of these institutions and of the Alliance are complementary.
Dialogue
29. The new situation in Europe has multiplied the opportunities for dialogue on the part of the Alliance with the 
Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Alliance has established regular diplomatic 
liaison and military contacts with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe as provided for in the London Declaration. 
The Alliance vrill further promote dialogue through regular diplomatic liaison. Including an intensified exchange of views 
and information on security policy issues. Through such means the Allies individually and collectively, will seek to make 
full use of the unprecedented opportunities of afforded by the growth of freedom and democracy throughout Europe and 
encourage greater mutual urxierstanding of respective security concerns, to Increase transparency and predictability in 
security affairs, and thus to reinforce stability. The military can help to overcome the divisions of the past, not least 
through intensified military contacts and greater military transparency. The Alliance's pursuit of dialogue will provide a 
foundation for greater cooperation throughout Europe and the ability to resolve differences and conflicts by peaceful 
means.
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Cooperation
30, The Alliance are also commrtted to pursue cooperation with ail states In Europe on the basis of the principles 
set out In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. They will seek to develop broader and productive patterns of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation in ail relevant Helds of European security, with the aim, inter alia, of preventing crises or, 
should they arise, ensuring their effective management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and other 
nations in dealing with specific problems vrill be an essential factor in moving beyorxj past divisions towards one Europe 
whole and free. This policy of cooperation Is the expression of the inseparability of security among Alliance members 
that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future Instability, and 
such divisions must thus be diminished.
Collective Defense
31. The political approach to security will thus become ir>creaslngly Important. Nonetheless, the military dimension 
remair»s essential. The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collecttvely In the 
common defense remain central to the Alliance's security objectives. Such a capability, together with political solidarity Is 
required In order to prevent any attempt at coercion or Intimidation, and to guarantee that military aggression directed 
against the Alliance can never perceived as an potion with any prospect of success. It is equally indispensable so that 
dialogue and cooperation can be undertaken with confidence and achieve their desired results.
Management of Crisis and Conflict Prevention
32. In the political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace 
and preventing v^r depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of crises affecting the security of its 
members. Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. 
Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable 
than before.
33. In these new circumstances there are Increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an 
early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political 
authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political 
and other measures, Including those in the military field. Close control by at political authorities of the Alliance will be 
applied from the outset and at all stages. Appropriate consultation and decision making procedures are essential to this 
end.
34. The potential of dialogue and cooperation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse 
crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of ail other states in Europe. To this 
end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and Its Institutions. Other bodies including the European 
Community, Western European Union and United Nations may also have an important role to play.
PART VI- GUIDELINES FOR DEFENSE 
Principles of Alliance Strategy
35. The diversity of challenges now facing the Alliance thus requires a broad approach to security. The 
transformed political and strategic environment enables the Alliance to change a number of Important features of its 
military strategy and to set out new guidelines, while reaffirming proven fundamental principles. At the London Summit, It 
was therefore agreed to prepare a new military strategy and a revised force posture responding to the changed 
circumstances.
36. Alliance strategy will continue to reflect a number of fundamental principles. The Alliance is purely 
defensive in purpose: none of its v\/eapons will ever be used except in self-defense, and it does not consider itself to be 
anyone's adversary. The Allies will maintain military strength adequate to convince any potential aggressor that the use of 
force against the territory of one of the Allies would meet collective and effective action by all of them and that the risks 
involved In Initiating conflict would outweigh any foreseeable gains. The forces of the Allies must therefore be able to 
defend Alliance frontiers, to stop an aggressor's advance as far forv^rd as possible, to maintain or restore the territorial 
integrity of Allied nations and to terminate war rapidly by making an aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack
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and withdraw. The role of the Alliance's military forces is to assure the territorial Integrity and political Independence of Its 
member states, and thus contribute to peace and stability in Europe.
37. The security of ail Allies is indivisible: an attack on one Is an attack on all. Alliance solidarity arxl strategic 
unity are accordingly crucial prerequisites for collective security. The achievement of the Alliar^ce’s objectives deperxls 
critically on the equitable sharing of roles, risks and responsibilities, as well as the ber»erits, of common defense. The 
presence of North American conventional and US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to American conventional arxl 
US nuclear forces in Europe remains vital to the security of Europe, which is inseparably linked to that of North America. 
As the process of developing a European security identity and defense role progress, and is reflected In the strer>gthenlng 
of the European pillar within the Alliance, the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the 
responsibility for the defense of Europe.
38. The collective nature of Alliance defertce is embodied in practical an^ngements that enable the Allies to 
enjoy the crucial political, military and resource advantages of collective defence, and prevent the renationalisation of 
defer)ce policies, without depriving the Allies of their sovereignty. The arrangements are based on an Integrated military 
structure as well as on cooperation and coordination agreements. Key features IfKlude collective force planning; comrrxxi 
operational planning; multinational formations; the stationing of forces outside home territory where appropriate on a 
mutual basis; crisis management and reinforcement arrangements; procedures for consultation; common starxlards and 
procedures for equipment, training and logistics; joint and combined exercises; and infrastructure, armaments and 
logistics cooperation.
39. To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable 
future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, 
although at a significantly reduced level. Both elements are essential to Alliance security and cannot substitute one for the 
other. Conventional forces contribute to war prevention by ensuring that no potential aggressor could contemplate a quick 
or easy victory or territorial risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must response options. But the Alliance's 
conventional forces alone cannot ensure the prevention of war. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering 
the risks of any aggression incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.
The Alliance's New Force Posture
40. At the London Summit, the Allies concerned agreed to move away, where appropriate, from the concept of 
forward defence towards a reduced fonvard presence, and to modify the principle of flexible response to reflect a reduced 
reliance on nuclear weapons. The changes stemming from the new strategic environment and the altered risks now 
facing the Alliance enable significant modifications to be made in the missions of the Allies’ military forces and In their 
posture.
The Missions of Alliance Military Forces
41. The primary role of Alliance forces, to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of member states, 
remains unchanged. But this role must take account of the new strategic environment, in which a single massive and 
global threat has given way to diverse and multi-directional risks. Alliance forces have different functions to perform in 
peace, crisis and war.
42. In peace, the role of Allied military forces is to guard against risks to the security of Alliance members; to 
contribute towards the maintenance of stability and balance in Europe; and to ensure that peace is preserved. They can 
contribute to dialogue and cooperation throughout Europe by their participation in confidence-building activities, including 
those which enhance transparency and improve communication; as well as in verification of arms control agreements. 
Allies could, further, be called upon to contribute to global stability and peace by providing forces for United Nations 
missions.
43. In the event of crises which might lead to a military threat to the security of Alliance members, the Alliance’s 
military forces can complement and reinforce political actions within a broad approach to security and thereby contribute 
to the management of such crises and their peaceful resolution. This requires that these forces have a capability for 
measured and timely responses in such circumstances; the capability to deter action against any Ally and. In the event 
that aggression takes place, to respond to and repel it as well as to reestablish the territorial integrity of member states.
44. While In the new security environment a general war In Europe has become highly unlikely. It cannot finally 
be ruled out. The Alliance's military forces, which have as their fundamental mission to protect peace, have to provide the
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essential insurance against potential risks at the minimum level necessary to prevent war of any kind, and, should 
aggression occur, to restore peace. Hence the need for the capabilities and the appropriate mix of forces already 
described.
Guidelines for the AXance's Force Posture
45. To implement its security objectives and strategic principles In the new environment, the organization of the 
Allies’ forces must be adapted to provide capabilities that can contribute to protecting peace, managing crises that affect 
the security of Alliance members, and preventing, while retaining at all times the means to defend, if necessary, all Allied 
territory and to restore peace. The posture of Allies' forces will conform to the guidelines developed in the following 
paragraphs.
46. The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance’s military forces will continue to reflect its 
strictly defensive nature and will be adapted accordingly to the new strategic environment including arms control 
agreements. This means in particular:
(a) that the overall size of the Allies’ forces and in many cases their readiness, will be reduced;
(b) that the maintenance of a comprehensive in-place linear defensive posture In the central region will no 
longer be required. The peacetime geographical distribution of forces will ensure a sufficient military presence 
throughout the territory of the Alliance, including where necessary forward deployment of appropriate forces. 
Regional considerations and. In particular, geostrategic differences within the Alliance will have to be taken into 
account, including the shorter warning times to which the northern and southern regions will be subject 
compared with the central region and, in the southern region, the potential for instability and the military 
capabilities in the adjacent areas.
47. To ensure that at this reduced level the Allies’ forces can play an effective role both in managing crises and 
in countering aggression against any Ally, they will require enhanced flexibility and mobility and an assured capability for 
augmentation when necessary. For these reasons:
(a) Available forces; will Include, in a limited but militarily significant proportion, ground, air and sea immediate 
and rapid reaction elements able to respond to a vride range of eventualities, many of which are unforeseeable. 
They will be of sufficient quality, quantity and readiness to deter a limrted attack and, if required, to defend the 
territory of the Allies against attacks, particularly those launched without long warning time.
(b) The forces of the Allies will be structured so as to permit their military capability to be built up when 
necessary. This ability to build up by reinforcement, by mobilizing reserves, or by reconstituting forces, must be 
in proportion to potential threats to Alliance security, including the possibility- albeit unlikely, but one that 
prudence dictates should not be ruled out- of a major conflict. Consequently, capabiirties for timely 
reinforcement and resupply both within Europe and form North America will be of critical Importance.
(c) Appropriate force structures and procedures, including those that would provide an ability to build up, 
deploy and draw down forces quickly and discriminately, will be developed to permits measured, flexible and 
timely responses in order to reduce and defuse tensions. These arrangements must be exercised regularly in 
peacetime.
(d) In the event of use of forces, including the deployment of reaction and other available reinforcing forces as 
an instrument of crisis management, the Alliance’s political authorities will, as before, exercise close control 
over their employment at all stages. Existing procedures will be reviewed In the light of the new missions and 
posture of Alliance forces.
Characteristics of Conventional Forces
48. It Is essential that the Allies’ military forces have a credible ability to fulfill their functions In peace, crisis and 
war in a way appropriate to the new security environment. This will be reflected In force and equipment levels; readiness 
and availability; training and exercises; deployment and employment options; and force build-up capabilities, all of which 
will be adjusted accordingly. The conventional forces of the Allies vAW include, in addition to immediate and rapid reaction 
forces, main defence forces, which will provide the bulk of forces needed to ensure the Alliance's territorial integrity and
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the unimpeded use of their lines of communication; and augmentation forces, which will provide a means of reinforcing 
existing forces in particular region. Main defence and augmentation forces will comprise both active and mobilisable 
elements.
49. Ground, maritime and air forces will have to cooperate closely and combine and assist each other in 
operations aimed at achieving agreed objectives. These forces will consist of the following:
(a) Ground forces, which are essential to hold or regain territory. The majority will normally be at lower states of 
readiness and, overall, there will be greater reliance on mobilization and reserves. All categories of ground 
forces will require demonstrable combat effectiveness together with an appropriately enhanced capability for 
flexible deployment.
(b) Maritime forces, v\rhlch because of their Inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an Important 
contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in 
order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land an amphibious operations, and to 
protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.
(c) Air forces, whose ability to fuirill their fundamental roles in both iixlependent air and combined operations- 
counter- air, air Interdiction and offensive air support- as well as contribute to surveillance, reconnaissance and 
electronic warfare operations. Is essential to the overall effectiveness of the Allies' military forces. Their role In 
supporting operations, on land and at sea, will require appropriate long-distance alrilfl and air refueling 
capabilities. Air defence forces, including modem air command and control systems, are required to ensure a 
secure air defence environment.
50. In light of the potential risks it poses, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction 
should be given special consideration. Solution of this problem will require complementary approaches Including, for 
example, export control and missile defenses.
51. Alliance strategy Is not dependent on a chemical v^rfare capability. The Allies remain committed to the 
earliest possible achievement of a global, comprehensive, and effectively verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. But, 
even after implementation of a global ban, precautions of a purely defensive nature will need to be maintained.
52. In the new security environment and given the reduced overall force levels In future, the ability to work 
closely together, which will facilitate the cost effective use of Alliance resources, will be particularly Important for the 
achievement of the missions of the Allies' forces. The Alliance's collective defense arrangements in which, for those 
concerned, the Integrated military structure. Including multinational forces, plays the key role, will be essential In this 
regard. Integrated and multinational European structures, as they are further developed In the context of an emerging 
European Defense Identity, will also Increasingly have a similarly Important role to play In enhancing the Allies' ability to 
work together In the common defence. Allies' efforts to achieve maximum cooperation will be based on the common 
guidelines for defence defined above. Practical arrangements will be developed to ensure the necessary mutual 
transparency and complementarity between the European security and defence Identity and the Alliance.
53. In order to be able to respond flexibly to be able to respond flexibly to a wide range of possible 
contlnger>cles, the Allies concerned vrill require effective surveillance and intelligence, flexible command and control, 
mobility within and between regions, and appropriate logistics capabilities. Including transport capacities. Logistics stocks 
must be sufficient to sustain all types of forces in order to permit effective defence until resupply Is available. The 
capability of the Allies concerned to build up larger, adequately equipped and trained forces. In a timely manner and to a 
level appropriate to any risk to Alliance security, will also make an essential contribution to crisis management and 
defence. This capability will Include the ability to reinforce any area at risk within the territory of the Allies and to establish 
a multinational presence when and where this Is needed. Elements of all three force categories vwll be capable of being 
employed flexibly as a part of both intra-European and transatlantic reinforcement. Proper use of these capabilities will 
require control of the necessary lines of communication as well as appropriate support and exercise arrangements. Civil 
resources vrill be of Increasing relevance In this context.
54. For the Allies concerned, collective defence arrangements will rely Increasingly on multinational forces, 
complementing national commitments to NATO. Multinational forces demonstrate the Alliance's resolve to maintain a 
credible collective defense; enhance Alliance cohesion; reinforce the transatlantic partnership and strengthen the 
European pillar. Multinational forces, and in particular reaction forces, reinforce solidarity. They can also provide a way of
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deploying more capable formations than might be available purely nationally, thus helping to make more efficient use of 
scarce defence resources. This may include a highly integrated, multinational approach to specific tasks and functions.
Characteristics of Nudear Forces
55. The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies Is political: to preserve peace and prevent 
coercion arid any kind of v^r. They will continue to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mlrxl of any 
aggressor about the nature of the Allies’ response to military aggression. They demonstrate that aggression of any kind is 
not a rational option. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the 
Alliance, particularly those of the Untied States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom arid France, which 
have a deterrent role of their own contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
56. A credible Alliance nuclear posture and the demonstration of Alliance solidarity and common commitment 
to war prevention continue to require widespread participation by European Allies Involved In collective defence planning In 
nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces on their territory and In command, control and consultation 
arrangement. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link 
between the European and the North American members of the Alliance. The Alliance will therefore maintain adequate 
nuclear forces in Europe. These forces need to have the necessary characteristics and appropriate flexibility and 
survivability, to be perceived as a credible and effective element of the Allies' strategy In preventing war. They be 
maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve peace and stability.
57. The Allies concerned consider that, with the radical changes In the security situation. Including 
conventional force levels in Europe maintained in relative balance and increased reaction times, NATO's ability to defuse 
a crisis through diplomatic and other means or, should It be necessary, to mount a successful conventional defence >vill 
significantly improve. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by them 
are therefore even more remote. They can therefore significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces, reinforcing the 
trans- Atlantic link. These will consist solely of dual capable aircraft which could. If necessary, be supplemented by 
offshore systems. Sub-strategic nuclear weapons will, however, not be deployed In normal circumstances on surface 
vessels and attack submarines. There is not requirement for nuclear artillery or ground-launched short-range nuclear 
missiles and they will be eliminated.
PART V-CONCLUSION
58. This Strategic Concept reaffirms the defensive nature of the Alliance and the resolve of its members to 
safeguard their security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Alliance's security policy is based on dialogue; 
cooperation; and effective collective defence as mutually reinforcing instruments for preserving the peace. Making full use 
of the new opportunities available, the Alliance will maintain security at the lowest possible level of forces consistent with 
the requirements of defence. In this way, the Alliance is making an essential contribution to promoting a lasting peaceful 
order.
59. The Allies \Arill continue to purpose vigorously further progress In arms control and confidence-building 
measures with the objective of enhancing security and stability. They will also play an active part in promoting dialogue 
and cooperation between states on the basis of the principles enunciated in the Paris Charter.
60. NATO's strategy will retain the flexibility to reflect further developments in the polrtic-mllltary environment, 
Including progress In the moves towards a European security Identity, and In any changes in the risks to Alliance security. 
For the Allies concerned, the Strategic Concept v I^I form the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence 
policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and Its collective defence planning 
arrangements.
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